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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
Investigating Innocence: 
Comprehensive Pre-trial Defense Investigation to Prevent Wrongful Convictions 
 
By 
 
Rosa Ellis Greenbaum 
 
Master of Arts in Social Ecology 
 
University of California, Irvine, 2019 
 
Professor Simon A. Cole, Chair 
 
 
 
The inability of public defense systems to provide sufficiently zealous legal representation to 
indigent clients is a long-standing and pervasive problem in the United States. The issue of 
excessive caseloads for public defenders is much discussed and studied, while the relatively 
more extreme deficit of public defense investigators is rarely mentioned. A competent defense 
investigation can forestall overcharging and excessive punishment as well as lay groundwork for 
dismissals and acquittals. Disproportionate consequences for defendants who have been falsely 
accused or whose charges are inflated arguably stem as much from anemic fact-finding practices 
of the defense as from limited or unexercised legal expertise. Indigent defendants, represented by 
lawyers whose access to investigative resources is frequently denied or severely truncated, may 
be at heightened risk of wrongful conviction and excessive punishment specifically as a result of 
this lack. My findings, drawn from a qualitative analysis of 366 cases listed in the National 
Registry of Exonerations in which Inadequate Legal Defense was deemed a contributor to a 
wrongful conviction, are consistent with such an assertion. Investigative failures were far more 
frequent than other types of legal inadequacies in the NRE’s ILD cases, appearing in 80.6% of 
 vi 
 
cases, while trial errors were found in just 50.8% of these wrongful convictions. In 34.7% of 
cases, the failures were solely investigative. The larger implication is that the relative dearth of 
investigators in public defense systems is a problem deserving similar attention as the more 
commonly understood issue of too few lawyers handling too many cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction1 
 
The Sixth Amendment bestows the right to the assistance of counsel upon defendants in 
criminal prosecutions, but it does not guarantee effective representation in court or a complete 
investigation of relevant facts before trial or plea bargain. At its inception, the right only applied 
in federal court proceedings and referred to privately retained counsel subject to a defendant’s 
ability to pay. It was the landmark decision in Powell v. Alabama (1932) that began to enlarge 
the conception of the right to counsel beyond the letter of the amendment. Powell held that 
counsel must be provided for defendants in capital cases regardless of ability to pay. It can be 
argued that this shift in the United States Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence was 
a response to the apparent innocence and flagrant framing of the Scottsboro defendants and the 
political campaigning on their behalf. Part of the basis for relief in Powell was that “No attempt 
was made to investigate” that innocence (1932, p. 58).When Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) was 
decided three decades later, the creation of a positive right of publicly funded counsel for all 
felony defendants in state court was a watershed event in the elaboration of defendants’ rights. 
Yet, fifty years later, the right to state-paid, effective assistance of counsel remains largely 
illusory (Chemerinsky, 2013). The Strickland v. Washington (1984) test for effectiveness is so 
lax as to suggest that not only is there no remedy, perhaps there is not even truly a right.   
Blume and Johnson (2013) warn that, “Even when his counsel is competent and diligent, 
a defendant may be deprived of the promise of Gideon due to a lack of investigative and expert 
services” (p. 2143). The defense investigator’s primary function is fact development and testing: 
reviewing discovery and supplemental records, interviewing clients and witnesses, viewing and 
documenting crime scenes and physical evidence, and conducting collateral research related to 
factual issues. A competent and well-trained investigator will also identify the appropriate 
experts to consult based on the specifics of a case. Unfortunately, in many jurisdictions the 
                                                     
1 This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship 
Program under Grant No. DGE-1321846. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in 
this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. 
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assistance of a fact investigator is promised only in the most serious cases, and even in those 
places its provision may be haphazard. Many public defense offices do not employ enough 
investigators to handle their caseloads, and others employ no investigators at all. If a skilled and 
zealous lawyer is critical to securing a defendant’s legal rights, then arguably a complementary 
investigator is critical to establishing the necessary facts required to achieve outcomes that give 
substance to those rights. I argue that the data from known exonerations supports the idea that 
expanding the use of well-trained defense investigators to perform more comprehensive pre-trial 
defense investigations has the potential to reduce convictions of factually innocent people, and to 
mitigate many other injustices implicated in the criminal legal system as well.  
Right to assistance of counsel  
Prior to Powell, the federal constitutional right to assistance of counsel was construed as the 
right of a defendant to hire a lawyer—so long as he could pay. Where nine young black men were 
facing death sentences for capital rape, Powell held that “the necessity of counsel was so vital and 
imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was 
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment” (1932, p. 71). 
But the ruling applied only to capital cases and the Court minimized its effect, professing that most 
states were already in the habit of providing counsel for those unable to pay in serious criminal 
cases2. The Court framed the ruling as reflecting an extant right, rather than the establishment of a 
new one (Powell v. Alabama, 1932, p. 73).  A few years later, Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) held that 
all indigent federal defendants must be afforded state-paid counsel. Gideon extended this provision 
to the states, although it was unclear at the time whether this applied to all crimes or only felonies. 
Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) clarified that counsel for the indigent must be provided for all 
charges which carry a sentence of potential imprisonment. 
Right to effective assistance of competent counsel 
Powell also marked the first time that the Court endorsed the “nascent legal principle that 
                                                     
2 In fact, thirteen states had no such provision when Powell was decided (Blume & Johnson, 2013). 
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attorney incompetence could be grounds for a new trial” (Mayeaux, 2014, p. 2181). Still, for many 
years after Powell, the right to counsel was interpreted as a bare, yes-no proposition; if counsel 
made appearance that was generally sufficient—counsel had been effected. In Diggs v. Welch 
(1945)3 a federal circuit court found that “…subsequent negligence [of appointed counsel] does 
not deprive the accused of any right under the Sixth Amendment” (p. 668). A common early test 
for reversal adopted by some lower courts required that counsel’s performance must be so deficient 
as to make a “mockery of justice” and shock the conscience of the court; “[the] ‘mockery’ test 
[was] itself a mockery of the sixth amendment” (Bazelon, 1973, p. 28).  
In a footnote to McMann v. Richardson (1970) the Court insisted that: “It has long been 
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel” (fn14), and 
went on to list a number of cases standing for the principle: Reece v. Georgia (1955); Glasser v. 
United States, (1942); Avery v. Alabama (1940); and Powell. However, Reece involved absence 
of counsel at a critical stage, and Glasser concerned the right to conflict-free counsel. Only 
Avery, another capital case, included any extended discussion of whether counsel’s performance 
was not “mere formalit[y]” but was objectively “earnest and zealous” (1940, p. 451). Avery’s 
counsel was appointed on the day of his arrest, March 21, 1938, requested and was denied a 
continuance to investigate his mental health, and proceeded to trial on March 24 (Avery v. 
Alabama, 1940, p. 448). Avery’s conviction and death sentence were affirmed; an “earnest and 
zealous” capital defense could be accomplished in three days decreed the Court as it also 
referenced its “[v]igilant concern for the maintenance of the constitutional right of an accused to 
assistance of counsel” (p. 445). In practice, and for decades thereafter, appellate standards of 
enforcement of the right to effective, competent counsel were so low as to render them 
functionally meaningless (Bazelon, 1973)  
Two decisions published on the same day in 1984 ostensibly provided more exacting 
federal standards by which to judge counsel’s performance. United States v. Cronic (1984) 
                                                     
3 Later upheld by the Supreme Court in Diggs v. Welch, 325 U.S. 889 (1945). 
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established that the complete absence of counsel at a critical stage compromised the adversarial 
process and created a per se presumption of ineffectiveness. Strickland created a two-prong test 
for ineffective assistance where counsel had been constructively present. The first prong required 
that counsel’s performance must have been deficient based on prevailing standards of reasonably 
effective assistance. The second prong required a showing of prejudice, namely that counsel’s 
unprofessional errors undermined confidence in the outcome of the proceeding (Strickland v. 
Washington, 1984, p. 688). The test could be done backwards; if no prejudice could be shown 
then it was not necessary to evaluate whether counsel’s performance had been deficient. Great 
deference to counsel’s strategic decisions and a presumption of reasonableness was to be 
afforded to counsel’s actions (Strickland v. Washington, 1984, pp. 690, 698). David 
Washington’s attorney conducted virtually no capital penalty phase investigation into his life 
history and did not request a psychiatric examination. The attorney had made the decision not to 
present such evidence before discovering to what extent it existed, based on his belief that the 
existence of Washington’s confession had made such an effort an exercise in futility; his 
“strategic decision” was that a show of remorse would be more persuasive with the trial judge 
(Strickland v. Washington, 1984, p. 700). The Court found neither prejudice nor deficient 
performance, and Washington’s death sentence was upheld. The Court declined to create specific 
standards of performance. 
The Strickland test for ineffectiveness creates such a heavy burden of proof for an 
appellant that it is nearly impossible to win on such a claim. It essentially turns on hindsight 
evaluation of attorney performance against a harmless error test. Ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims are rarely successful. Of 4,000 such claims decided in state and federal courts between 
1970 and 1983, only 3.9% found ineffective assistance (Klein, 1986). A 1995 study found a 
success rate of less than one percent (Klein, 1999). In light of these jurisprudential realities, it is 
imperative that cases be correctly defended from the outset.  
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Counsel’s duty to investigate and the crisis in indigent defense (investigation) 
Gable and Green (2004) assert that the rare relief that issues from Strickland is reserved 
for defendants claiming factual innocence or challenging death sentences. It is not a vehicle for 
assuring that indigent defendants receive effective assistance of counsel, including necessary 
investigations. In order to be effective, counsel must investigate facts as well as legal issues (see 
Zeitlan, 1977). As the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Nixon (1974): “The need to 
develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive” (p. 
709). An examination of the state of public defense over the last five decades shows that the 
promise of McMann remains unevenly fulfilled; specifically, criminal defendants are not reliably 
receiving adequate preparation and investigation of their cases (Backus & Marcus, 2006; Joy & 
McMunigal, 2003; National Right to Counsel Committee, 2009).  
One observer calls Strickland “a doctrine of enormous proportions, but with little impact-
- a legal tyrannosaurus rex without teeth” (Rigg, 2007, p. 78). There was much excitement within 
the defense bar after the Court’s rulings in Williams v. Taylor (2000) and, later, Wiggins v. Smith 
(2003) and Rompilla v. Beard (2005). Lawyers had done more in these cases than Strickland 
defendant David Washington’s trial attorney had done, yet their incomplete investigations were 
deemed deficient and prejudicial. Roberts (2004) noted that these principles applied to non-
capital as well as death penalty cases. In her estimate, “The Wiggins’ Court’s decision… signals 
a clear move towards greater scrutiny of failures to investigate…” (Roberts, 2004, p. 1120). The 
applause for the Court appears to have been premature. It may now be easier to prevail on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim alleging failure to conduct an adequate capital 
penalty phase investigation, and professional standards for capital case defense have clearly 
become more stringent since 1984. But while the aforementioned decisions apply to non-capital 
cases in theory, for the vast majority of criminal defendants, they do little to assure that effective 
representation, including the background and fact investigation typically required for true 
adversarial testing, will actually occur. The American Bar Association (1993) Defense Function 
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Standards4 insist that “defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the 
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the 
case and the penalty in the event of conviction” (4- 4.1.a). But the Standards are non-specific and 
not binding, and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Strickland suggested that feeling “hopeless” 
(1984, p. 699) about what might be gained from conducting a full investigation was a reasonable 
basis for declining to do so. “[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations 
on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make 
a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary” (Strickland v. 
Washington, 1984, pp. 690-691).  
At the time that Gideon was decided, 43 percent of criminal defendants qualified as 
indigent (Stuntz, 1997); by 2005 that figure was more than 80 percent (Backus & Markus, 2006). 
For this reason, it might make sense to regard the crisis in indigent defense more generally, as 
simply a crisis in criminal defense. By the late 1970s, criminal dockets had begun to explode as 
defense budgets shrank. Plea bargaining became the predominant method of adjudicating 
colossal criminal caseloads. All of these trends have had a negative impact on the ability of 
criminal defendants to mount fact-based defenses, the pain of which is felt particularly by those 
whose charges are false or exaggerated. Many of the barriers to comprehensive fact investigation 
are institutional; excessive caseloads and lack of funding may render counsel ineffective, if not 
to the level required to satisfy Strickland then certainly when operating under a less forgiving 
definition of the term, such as that which might be gleaned from the ABA (1993) Defense 
Function Standards on the duty to investigate. Though the literature directly addressing the 
                                                     
4 “(a) Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all 
avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction. The 
investigation should include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement 
authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to defense counsel of 
facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty.” ©1993 by the American Bar 
Association.  Reprinted with permission.  All rights reserved.  This information or any or portion thereof may not be 
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without 
the express written consent of the American Bar Association. 
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question is rather sparse, empirical evidence suggests that the adequacy of fact investigation has 
been lacking, both pre- and post-Strickland.  
In Zemans and Rosenblum’s (1981) survey of over 500 Chicago lawyers, respondents 
rated two skills (out of 21) as the most critical to the practice of law: “fact gathering” and 
“capacity to marshall [sic] facts and order them so that concepts can be applied” (cited in 
Lowenthal, 1981, p. 469).  Lowenthal (1981) interviewed 173 criminal defense lawyers in 
Phoenix, Arizona. Many of the items in that survey focused on fact development as a distinct 
category of legal practice, and Lowenthal (1981) noted that this skill set is not part of the typical 
training in legal education (citing Zemans & Rosenblum, 1981). Lowenthal (1981) found that 
14.6 percent of the respondents interviewed none of the prosecution’s witnesses and that 21.4 
percent of those said the reason for not conducting interviews was that they knew what the 
witness would say from police reports (Steiner, 1981). And although almost all attorneys were 
diligent in obtaining police reports, names of prosecution witnesses, and statements of their 
clients, they were less likely to obtain their clients’ criminal records5 (85.2%), examine physical 
evidence (75%), or review test results (65.7%) (Steiner, 1981). Freedman (2005) cites a study 
(Mirsky & McConville, 1989) that examined the vouchers submitted by court appointed defense 
attorneys in New York City and found that reimbursement was requested for investigation in 
only 27 percent of homicide cases and only 12 percent of other felonies. Reflecting on the results 
of these studies, Luban (1993) notes that “…it is perhaps unsurprising that defense lawyers do 
very little factual investigation of their cases, but we are nonetheless entitled to get depressed 
over just how little” (p. 1734). 
The National Legal Aid and Defender Association, since 1976, has recommended a ratio 
of one investigator to every three attorneys (NLADA, 1976)6. A 2007 census of county based 
                                                     
5 Failure of his attorney to obtain the transcript from a previous conviction that the state intended to present in 
aggravation at his capital penalty phase proceeding was the basis upon which the U.S.S.C. upheld a lower court’s 
finding that Terry Williams had been denied effective assistance of counsel, Williams v. Taylor. 529 U.S. 362. 
(2000). 
6 At the state capital defender where I was employed as an investigator, active cases were typically assigned a lead 
attorney, second-chair attorney and an investigator. For cases coming to evidentiary hearing or under a death 
warrant, often a third attorney and second investigator would also be enlisted to assist. In the homicide unit of the 
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and local public defender offices found that 40 percent had no full-time investigators on staff at 
all, and that, overall, there were approximately 1.5 investigators for every 10 attorneys; only 
seven percent of offices had the recommended one-to-three ratio (Farole & Langton, 2010). In 
their census of state public defender programs, the average ratio was better, at about one to six7; 
however, the ratio in Arkansas was less than one to thirty (Langton & Farole, 2010). In 
Michigan, appointed attorneys routinely had requests for investigative assistance denied and in 
one county, investigative assistance is so rare that a common practice of defense attorneys is 
asking law enforcement officers  to conduct their investigations for them (National Right to 
Counsel Committee, 2009). This is the antithesis of independent adversarial testing and fails 
even the archaic “farce-and-mockery” test. 
In an op-ed, staff attorney Tina Peng (2015) described the hurdles to investigation 
confronting the Orleans Public Defenders: 
“[M]y office considers how serious [clients’] cases are before deciding how many 
resources to devote to them. We have only nine investigators to handle more than  
18,000 felony and misdemeanor cases each year. One investigator describes being 
so overwhelmed that he is often unable to canvass for relevant surveillance 
footage until it has already been deleted. Another investigator said that recently, 
in a span of a week and a half, she was assigned three cases carrying sentences of 
mandatory life without parole…Working around the clock, the investigator 
completed full investigations for two of those cases. For the third, she was able 
only to knock on one witness’s door twice.” 
Decades after it was documented in Phoenix and New York City, the failure to fully 
investigate the cases of poor defendants seemingly remains a problem in many areas.  Echoing 
                                                     
Philadelphia Defender Association, each client is assigned two attorneys and at least one investigator (Anderson & 
Heaton, 2012). Many cases involve complex factual issues, even where the potential penalty is less than a sentence 
of life imprisonment or death, and all felony convictions have serious central and collateral consequences. 
7 A statistical analysis of state-administered public defense systems updated to 2013 found an average ratio of 
investigators to line attorneys in those jurisdictions to be slightly higher, at 1:5.5 (Strong, 2017). The updated 
county-based analysis is said to be forthcoming. 
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the work of McConnville & Mirsky (1989) on court-appointed attorneys, Beeman & Riggs’ 
(2004) study of public defense practices in North Dakota found that investigators were rarely 
requested and often denied, although one contract attorney they interviewed told them that “his 
clients benefited every time he has hired an investigator, either through a reduced sentence or a 
dismissal” (p. 15). California has long been seen as a pioneer in providing quality criminal 
defense to the indigent; it established the first public defender office in the country in Los 
Angeles County in 19148 (Bliss, 1956). Yet Benner (2009) found fact gathering problems in 
California that echo those found by researchers thirty years earlier. Benner (2009) consulted 
court statistics and surveyed judges, indigent defense providers and private attorneys engaged in 
criminal practice. In addition to excessive attorney caseloads, Benner (2009) found that every 
single respondent from the public defender category said that investigator workloads were 
excessive, and more than three-quarters said this was a serious problem. Ninety percent of judge 
respondents said that fees for appointed counsel were insufficient for proper case investigation 
(Benner, 2009). Analyzing 121 successful California state and federal appellate ineffective 
assistance claims (about five percent of 2,500 claims raised), Benner (2009) found that in 44 
percent of these cases, relief was granted based on “failure to conduct an adequate 
investigation”9 (p. 324) and concludes that, “The most important finding from our study is the 
discovery that indigent defense providers in many California counties lack the resources 
necessary to conduct adequate defense investigations” (p. 277). As Levine (1984) contends, 
“even the best trained and most highly motivated defense attorneys can perform only as well as 
the available facts permit” (pp. 1396-1397). 
Inadequate counsel, failure to investigate, and wrongful convictions 
In contrast to the general and somewhat vague ABA (1993) Defense Function Standard 
on the duty to investigate (see fn4), the organization’s guideline for guilt phase investigation in 
                                                     
8 However, that office did not hire paid investigators until 1946, having previously relied on volunteers (Bliss, 1956). 
9 Benner (2009) notes that “…in the majority (74%) of these cases, counsel’s failure went directly to the heart of 
guilt or innocence” (p. 324) 
 10 
 
capital cases (2003)10 is specific and detailed.  The accompanying commentary “states explicitly 
that it is the developing understanding about the causes of wrongful conviction that has driven 
the evolving standards. Such concerns ‘underscore[ ] the importance of defense counsel’s duty to 
take seriously the possibility of the client’s innocence, to scrutinize carefully the quality of the 
state’s case, and to investigate and re-investigate all possible defenses’” (Roberts, 2004, p. 1119, 
quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases, 2003, Guideline 10.7 Commentary). This duty to take potential innocence 
seriously and investigate inheres in the vastly larger number of non-capital cases as well11.  
                                                     
10 “…elements of an appropriate investigation include the following:  
1. Charging Documents: Copies of all charging documents in the case should be obtained and examined in 
the context of the applicable law to identify: a. the elements of the charged offense(s), including the element(s) 
alleged to make the death penalty applicable; b. the defenses, ordinary and affirmative, that may be available to the 
substantive charge and to the applicability of the death penalty; c. any issues, constitutional or otherwise, (such as 
statutes of limitations or double jeopardy) that can be raised to attack the charging documents; and d. defense 
counsel’s right to obtain information in the possession of the government, and the applicability, extent, and validity 
of any obligation that might arise to provide reciprocal discovery.  
2. Potential Witnesses: a. Barring exceptional circumstances, counsel should seek out and interview 
potential witnesses, including, but not limited to: (1) eyewitnesses or other witnesses having purported knowledge of 
events surrounding the alleged offense itself; (2) potential alibi witnesses; (3) witnesses familiar with aspects of the 
client’s life history that might affect the likelihood that the client committed the charged offense(s), and the degree 
of culpability for the offense, including: (a) members of the client’s immediate and extended family (b) neighbors, 
friends and acquaintances who knew the client or his family (c) former teachers, clergy, employers, co-workers, 
social service providers, and doctors (d) correctional, probation, or parole officers; (4) members of the victim’s 
family. b. Counsel should conduct interviews of potential witnesses in the presence of a third person so that there is 
someone to call as a defense witness at trial. Alternatively, counsel should have an investigator or mitigation 
specialist conduct the interviews. Counsel should investigate all sources of possible impeachment of defense and 
prosecution witnesses.  
3. The Police and Prosecution: Counsel should make efforts to secure information in the possession of the 
prosecution or law enforcement authorities, including police reports, autopsy reports, photos, video or audio tape 
recordings, and crime scene and crime lab reports together with the underlying data therefor. Where necessary, 
counsel should pursue such efforts through formal and informal discovery.  
4. Physical Evidence: Counsel should make a prompt request to the relevant government agencies for any 
physical evidence or expert reports relevant to the offense or sentencing, as well as the underlying materials. With 
the assistance of appropriate experts, counsel should then aggressively re-examine all of the government’s forensic 
evidence, and conduct appropriate analyses of all other available forensic evidence.  
5. The Scene: Counsel should view the scene of the alleged offense as soon as possible. This should be 
done under circumstances as similar as possible to those existing at the time of the alleged incident (e.g., weather, 
time of day, and lighting conditions)” (ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel 
in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 10.7, 2003, pp. 1018-1020 [footnotes omitted]. ©2003 by the American Bar 
Association.  Reprinted with permission.  All rights reserved.  This information or any or portion thereof may not be 
copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without 
the express written consent of the American Bar Association. 
11 For a discussion of how standards for capital penalty phase investigation have begun to penetrate some non-
capital cases, see Mundy, 2013. 
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Scholars have frequently cited ineffective assistance of counsel as a leading contributor to 
wrongful convictions, along with other common problems such as mistaken eyewitnesses, police 
and prosecutorial misconduct and false confessions. Radelet, Bedau, and Putnam (1992) describe 
many instances of inadequate defense counsel in their study of over 400 wrongful convictions in 
potentially capital cases, including one in which the lawyer “had no investigator to dig up leads 
(much less follow them), paid no serious attention to the possibility that [another suspect] rather 
than [the defendant] was guilty, and never contested the improprieties of the police line-up…” 
(p. 42). The errors cited throughout fall into both the advocatory and the investigatory realms 
(Radelet, Bedau & Putnam, 1992). Many books on wrongful convictions written for a popular 
audience include chapters on ineffective assistance of counsel, and tend to offer a handful of case 
examples that detail some drivers of IAC and demonstrate how serious its consequences can be 
12.  According to Gould and Leo (2010), “The central reason behind ineffective representation is 
inadequate funding, an absence of quality control, and a lack of motivation” which may manifest 
in “narrow or shallow investigation” (p. 855) among other deficits. Huff, Rattner and Sagarin 
(1996) also note that “excellent investigations” may be precluded by insufficient funding 
resources (p. 77). Such investigations may also be impeded by “norms that include the 
presumption that most clients are in fact guilty” (Worden, Davies & Brown, 2014, p. 210). 
Inadequate counsel in the context of wrongful conviction has not been specifically 
subject to the same type of extended discussion and empirical investigation as some of the other 
commonly cited contributors. Unlike false confessions and eyewitness misidentification, which 
are the subject of what Leo (2005) calls “specialized literatures” (p. 208), inadequate counsel is 
not so amenable to experimental research and does not lend itself to relatively simple protocols 
for curtailing it, such as implementing double blind line-up procedures and videotaping of 
interrogations. As Garrett (2011) notes, IAC has been difficult to study in wrongful conviction 
cases: “Precisely due to [the] lawyer’s ineffectiveness, one cannot tell from the trial records what 
                                                     
12 “Sleeping Lawyers” (Scheck, Neufeld & Dwyer, 2003, pp. 237-249); “The Court Jesters” (Yant, 1991, pp. 159-
176); and “Ineffective Counsel” (Christianson, 2004, pp. 93-99), for example.  
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powerful arguments and evidence an effective lawyer would have presented to the jury” (p. 166). 
It is only when records surrounding the exoneration are compiled that it becomes remotely 
possible to make such an inquiry. The demanding nature of the Strickland standard for relief, 
requiring IAC claimants to prove what an effective lawyer could have accomplished at trial, 
means that in many cases such a record will have been created—even if relief was not 
forthcoming on those grounds. The study below is a preliminary attempt to outline the contours 
of inadequate counsel in known wrongful conviction cases, drawing on a large, publicly 
available data set and its corresponding non-public archive, to further describe the nature of the 
investigative failures therein, and to the extent possible, what underlying conditions may be 
implicated.  
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Chapter 1  
Current Study:  
“Inadequate Legal Defense” as a contributor to wrongful convictions  
The National Registry of Exonerations (NRE)13 documents cases in which people were 
convicted and later exonerated in the United States from 1989 to the present. Each individual 
case entry includes demographic and regional information; dates of offense, conviction and 
exoneration; crimes of conviction and sentence; a list of contributing causes to the conviction 
(false confession, mistaken eyewitness identification, false or misleading forensic evidence, 
perjury/false accusation, official misconduct, and inadequate legal defense); whether DNA 
evidence played a role in the exoneration; and a factual summary of the circumstances of 
conviction and exoneration.  
The NRE tracks exonerations, not wrongful convictions. It is not representative of 
undiscovered wrongful convictions and the cases it includes are undoubtedly skewed in ways 
both obvious and obscure. More serious crimes and convictions carry longer sentences that 
provide both greater time and motivation to undo. The availability of appellate relief varies 
greatly among regional court systems. The level of activity of the press, innocence projects and 
clinics, and other interested parties in securing exonerations is not evenly distributed. Beyond 
that, case summaries are drawn from the available documentation held in the non-public NRE 
archive, which varies widely among cases in volume, level of detail, and source type.  
This analysis concerns the NRE’s first 1,635 cases, of which 381 (23.4%) include 
inadequate legal defense (ILD) as a contributor to the wrongful conviction, as determined by 
NRE researchers. Thirty-six cases14 list ILD as the sole contributor. It is important to note that, 
unlike the cases in Benner’s (2009) sample of successful IAC claims, many of these convictions 
                                                     
13 The NRE is a project of the Newkirk Center for Science & Society at University of California Irvine, the 
University of Michigan Law School and Michigan State University College of Law. 
14 L. Acero, B. F. Allen, M. Belcher, D. Bivens Jr., D. Contee, N. J. Croy, M. Earle, C. Eason, Y. Eldridge, A. 
Golden, R. Greer, A. Hebrard, B. Henly, M. Hernandez, E. Hughes, T. Jasin, L. D. Jones, T. L. Jones, K. F. Lee, P. 
P. Magnan, G. McKenzie, M. Mikes, J. Miller Jr., N. Moreno, B. Neirynck, G. Nobles, L. Pettit, N. Rhoades, S. 
Rigel, S. A. Rivera, Tammy Smith, C. Stonehouse, L. Swanagan, L. Thain, M. Thorn, H. Wells. 
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were not overturned on the basis of a judicial determination that trial counsel’s performance was 
deficient and prejudicial but on other grounds or through other processes. 
I conducted qualitative analysis of these 381 ILD cases to address the following research 
questions: 
1) How many of the ILD cases involved failures to conduct proper fact investigation versus 
other types of legal failures?  
2) What patterns emerge when the investigative failures described therein are systematically 
analyzed? 
3) How many of these wrongful convictions might have been prevented if an effective fact 
investigation had been conducted at the pre-trial stage? 
This was an iterative process in which only the first question was clearly formulated at 
the outset. The specific categories of attorney failure and patterns of investigative failure 
emerged only as I worked through the data and created codes.  
On my first reading of the NRE summaries, which ranged from about 200 words on the 
short end to more than 2,000 words for the longest summaries, I simply noted whether an 
investigative failure was implicated, or if the failure was another type of lawyer misstep. It soon 
became clear that many cases had both types of failures. I then went back and coded each case as 
investigative or other legal failure or both, and if an investigator played a role in the case at trial 
or in postconviction I noted that as well, although most summaries did not include that 
information. My codes at first were very specific (such as: a) “failed to object to in-court 
identification”; b) “represented alternate suspect”; c) “failed to review exculpatory serology 
report”; d) “failed to request fingerprint analysis”) and then as larger patterns of failure began to 
emerge, my codes evolved into more general categories (the examples listed above evolved as 
follows: a) “trial error(s)”; b) “ethical violation(s)”; c) “failure to investigate discovery”; d) 
“failure to investigate physical evidence”). Drawing from the summaries, I created the bullets 
below (and those additionally found in Appendix A., pp. 48-59) to succinctly exemplify and 
quantify each type of investigative failure in the selected cases after completing this iterative 
coding and categorization process.  
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In the second stage of analysis, I reviewed and indexed all available source documents in 
the non-public archive from which the NRE summaries were written for all cases in which a 
failure to investigate was indicated or suggested, and also reviewed numerous source documents 
for ILD cases in which failure to investigate was not indicated in the summaries as a cross-check. 
Source documents varied in type and volume for each case, but generally consisted of media 
reports, appellate and postconviction briefs and petitions, and reviewing courts’ opinions and 
orders15. The sample was reduced to 366 cases after removal of 15 cases in which either the 
specific attorney failure could not be discerned from either the summary or the source 
documents, or the apparent failure occurred at the appellate stage16. As a result of this second-
stage review, I re-classified some cases and found additional types of error in others.  
Investigative or legal missteps? 
Inadequate legal defense can be divided into some general categories, in which failure to 
investigate is a distinct area. Other areas of counsel failure relate more directly to the lawyer’s 
unique role as holder of a Juris Doctorate, member of the bar and officer of the court. Along with 
“Failure to Investigate”, Benner’s (2009) “IAC Classification” (p. 356) schema includes other 
categories of lawyer ineffectiveness that relate to those functions solely within the province of 
licensed attorneys. Drawn from opinions resolving successful IAC claims, these include: “Lack 
of Trial Skills”; “Failure to Raise Mental Health Issue”; “Failure to File Notice of Appeal”; 
“Lack of Knowledge of Law”; “Guilty Plea Advice”; “Failure to Suppress Inadmissible 
Evidence”; “Failure to Object”; “Failure to Call Witness”, etc. (Benner, 2009, pp. 356-372). 
Much of the literature on wrongful convictions and ineffective assistance of counsel does not 
make such a clear distinction between 1) counsel’s mandate to investigate and 2) the duty to be 
                                                     
15 In a fair number of cases, there was no written opinion and relief was granted from the bench, or an order was 
issued without any substantive discussion. Working with an undergraduate research assistant, I collected 
approximately 50 opinions granting relief that were not previously held in the NRE archive, but some could not be 
obtained despite our efforts. 
16 Four cases involved only appellate counsel error (D. Bolstad, K. Boyd, Jr, W. Lomax, D. Patrick.); 11 cases could 
not be classified as any specific type of trial attorney failure, even after review of NRE source documents (M. 
Belcher, R. Cole, N. Croy, G. Drinkard, B. Ellis, N. Fields, L. Gardner, C. McCollum, M. McCormick, M. Miller, P. 
Phillips).  
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ethical, knowledgeable in the law and to make reasonable strategic decisions in the course of trial 
or plea negotiation. Where the distinction is made, failure to investigate is sometimes included in 
a list of counsel errors that is dominated by failures that fall squarely into the second category. 
For example, in describing IAC claims pursued in the first 255 DNA exonerations, West (2010) 
reports that:  
“…the most common types of claims included defense lawyers who: failed to 
present defense witnesses (often to establish/confirm an alibi); failed to seek DNA 
testing or have serology testing done to try to exclude the client; failed to object to 
prosecutor arguments or to evidence introduced by the state; and failed to 
interview witnesses in preparation for trial or to cross examine state witnesses… 
less frequently reported claims included failure to investigate [emphasis added], 
failure to object to an ID, and failure to present expert testimony” (p. 4). 
Parsing this list carefully, many of these examples, such as failure to interview witnesses and 
failure to seek DNA testing, actually indicate a failure to investigate. Fact investigation, legal 
research and writing, negotiation and litigation are distinct areas of practice that draw on 
different skill sets and abilities; it makes sense to examine them separately.  
To answer my first question, I first read the summary and then reviewed the source 
material for the ILD cases, and coded the failures of counsel as either failure to investigate (FTI); 
or a type of legal failure: trial errors (TE), ethical violations (EV), mistakes of law (ML), and 
pre-trial errors (PTE); or some combination of these. The different types of defense failure, and 
their frequency in terms of absolute number and percentage of the 366 cases are detailed 
below in Table 1. 
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  Table 1. Types of defense failure. 
Type of defense failure Number of 
cases 
Percentage of 
cases 
Failure to investigate 295  80.6 
Trial errors 186  50.8 
Ethical violations   45  12.3 
Pre-trial errors   34    9.3 
Mistakes of law   33    9.0 
 
• 33 cases (9.0%) hinged at least partially on pure mistakes of law, such as an attorney 
being unaware that witnesses could be subpoenaed from out of state to testify. 
• 34 cases (9.3%) included pre-trial legal errors, such as not timely listing witnesses or 
failing to follow proper pre-trial procedures for entering evidence, resulting in the 
exclusion of exculpatory witnesses or evidence. 
• 45 cases (12.3%) involved gross ethical violations or misconduct, such as attorneys 
operating under actual conflicts of interest, or, in one case, without proper licensing.  
• 186 cases (50.8%) involved trial errors, such as introducing damaging evidence or failing 
to impeach inculpatory witnesses with evidence in the lawyer’s possession. 142 (38.8%) 
cases involved trial errors along with other types of legal errors and/or failures to 
investigate; in 44 cases (12.0%), trial errors constituted the sole attorney failure.  
• 295 cases (80.6%) involved failure to investigate. In 168 cases (45.9%) FTI was present 
along with one or more other types of legal failures; FTI was the sole failure in 127 cases 
(34.7%).  
• Of the 36 cases in which ILD was listed as the sole contributor by NRE researchers, 26 
(72.2%) involved FTI. Of the 29 ILD cases in which the exoneree had been sentenced to 
death, 22 (75.9%) involved FTI. 
Common fact investigation failures 
FTI took a number of common forms in the study sample of 295 cases. The categories 
were not mutually exclusive, and many cases involved more than one of these. The 
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different categories of investigative failure, and their frequency in terms of absolute number and 
percentage of the 295 cases are detailed below in Table 2. 
 
  Table 2. Types of investigation failure. 
Failure to investigate: Number of 
cases 
Percentage of 
cases 
Inculpatory witnesses 113  38.3 
Exculpatory witnesses   87  29.5 
Physical evidence   70  23.7 
Alibi evidence   66  22.4 
Alternate suspects   59  20.0 
Medical evidence   53  18.0 
Discovery material   48  16.3 
Crime scene   16    5.4 
DNA evidence   14    4.7 
Client's mental status and/or 
psychological background 
  12    4.1 
Client's criminal history     9    3.1 
Client's physical condition     5    1.7 
Client's cultural and linguistic 
background 
    2      .7 
 
Below I describe these common forms and provide examples adapted from the NRE 
summaries (The National Registry of Exonerations, 2015). In some of the examples, the form of 
investigative failure described was the critical lapse and in others it was not. A few are from cases 
where the impact of the investigative failure was either unclear or where the legal failures in the 
case appeared to be more critical based on the unique circumstances of the case; I include those 
because they are illustrative of important patterns of investigative failure regardless. 
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Inculpatory witnesses 
Failure to investigate inculpatory witnesses was seen in 113 (38.3%) of the FTI cases17, 
making it the most common type of investigative failure across the FTI sample. John Henry 
Wigmore (1940) declared that cross-examination is “the greatest legal engine ever invented for 
the discovery of truth” (p. 5) and courts have generally accepted this pronouncement18 (Epstein, 
2008; Simon, 2012; Underwood, 1997). However, some scholars regard it as more shibboleth 
than valid legal principle. According to Epstein (2008): “The mythic status of cross-
examination… actually impedes accurate fact-finding because leading questions are not always 
an appropriate or sufficient tool for truth finding…” (p. 437). The effectiveness of cross-
examination as a means of dismantling an accusation perhaps depends less on eloquence in the 
courtroom than on prior knowledge brought to bear; the skill of an archer cannot overcome an 
empty quiver: its value “is questionable if defense counsel is not armed with background 
material derived from pretrial investigations of the surrounding circumstances and expert 
consultation on the technical facets of these circumstances” (Bowman, 1970, p. 643). 
Underwood (1997) says this about the limits cross-examination: “By the time a trial begins, any 
searching (for facts, witnesses, documents, etc.) had better be over” (p. 121). This is an 
especially pertinent observation in light of the fact that most criminal cases are resolved by 
dismissal or plea; cross-examinations are nearly as rare as trials themselves. 
 
                                                     
17 L. Adams,  R. Addison, R. Alowonle, J. Amrine, O. Anthony, M. Austin, E. Baker, J.L. Baker, B. Baran, J. Bass, 
J. Becerra, W. Berry, J. Blackshire, Ty Bradford, M. Bravo, G. Bright, R. Britton, R. Buchli II, M. Caldwell, V. 
Caminata, M. Catalan, C. Chatman, K. Y. Cheung, D. Clay Sr., E. Coker, R. Connor, M. Conteh,  R. Cridelle, W. 
Cservak, R. Cullipher, Y. Eldridge, Ernesto Flores, Jr., J. Garcia, T. W. Gassman, G. Gathers, R. Gondor, G. Gross, 
M. Hash, B. P. Herrera, J. Herrera, M. Hill, J. Jackson, E. Jackson-Knight, Andrew Johnson, Terrell Johnson, Jerry 
Jamaal Jones, Levon Jones, D. Kelly, J. Kluppelberg, R. Knupp, L. Lamb, R. E. Larson, D. M. Lawrence, W. Lopez, 
A. Luster, E. Lynn, F. Macias, T. Mason, B. McLaughlin, S. Mellen, Roberto Miranda, K. Mitchell, A. Morris, B. 
Neirynck, J. Palazollo, C. Parish, K. Pavel, V. Persad, J. C. Pichardo, C. Potts, J. Ramirez, J. Ramos, G. Randolph, 
E. Reasonover, K. Register, R. Resh, W. Robles, J. Rodriguez, C. Roesser, L. K. Rojas, R. Rose, R. Ross, R. 
Sanders, A. Sifuentes, T. Simmons III, L. Sinegal, Timothy Smith, P. E. Statler, G. Steidl, K. Stewart, W. Swift, J. 
Talamantez, D. Talley, D. Taylor, J. Tears, C. Thomas, P. Thompson, C. Tomlin, J. Trakhtenberg, J. Trulove, E. 
Truvia, D. Tucker, A. Vargas, J. Vaughn III, M. Verkullen, E. Wagstaffe, Joseph Walker, G. Walls, M. Weiner, J. 
Wheeler-Whichard, H. Whitlock, Antonio Williams, Emmaline Williams 
18 See California v. Green (1970); Dixon v. United States (2006); Lilly v. Virginia (1999); Watkins v. Sowders 
(1981). 
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Within this category, a number of distinct types of valuable impeachment evidence were 
not investigated. 
Criminal history: 
• A man who accused Magilie Conteh of robbing him could have been impeached with a 
prior conviction for a crime of dishonesty, but the trial attorney took the prosecutor’s 
word for it when told that the victim had no record (Jouvenal, 2013). 
Reputation for dishonesty or mental disturbance: 
• Victor Caminata was convicted of an arson in which his girlfriend had incriminated him. 
His postconviction defense team discovered that five years before the fire, the girlfriend 
had filed a false police report against a previous boyfriend (Possley, 2014a).  
 Evidence of dishonesty or confusion in discovery materials: 
• Terrence Mason’s attorney failed to use a helpful police report when he cross-examined 
the only eyewitness to a robbery who effectively implicated Mason. Under questioning 
by Mason’s appellate counsel at a post-conviction proceeding, the lawyer said that he 
“must not have noticed” the report but later claimed, in response to a professional 
grievance, that he “had chosen not to make an issue” of the police report “lest it backfire” 
(Mason v. Scully, 1994, pp. 27-28). 
Statements in direct conflict with other credible evidence: 
• George Lindstadt was accused of a sexual assault by a complainant who contradicted her 
own statement, and the court that granted relief  found that a “lawyer who conducted an 
adequate investigation could have elicited testimony by Lindstadt that he did not live 
with his daughter at the time of the alleged abuse, and in that way (and others) shaken the 
credibility of both key prosecution witnesses” (Lindstadt v. Keane, 2001, p. 193). 
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 Personal grudge: 
• Roberto Miranda provided his first attorney with the names of six people who could help 
prove his innocence, but the attorney did not interview any of them. One of those people 
was the ex-girlfriend of a man who claimed to have been present when Miranda stabbed 
the victim to death. When she was finally interviewed by Miranda’s habeas attorney, she 
told of a romantic rivalry that had existed between Miranda and the witness, who had 
made threats against Miranda. The judge who granted Miranda’s writ held that “the lack 
of pretrial investigation and preparation by trial counsel cannot be justified” (qtd. in 
Gross, c. 2012a).  
Financial incentive: 
• Carl Chatman was accused of sexual assault in a Cook County courtroom by an aide in 
2002.  Many years earlier, the woman had received a settlement after claiming to have 
been raped in an office building. She filed suit against Cook County just days after 
accusing Chatman and was eventually awarded over $400,000 (Possley, 2015a). 
 
Exculpatory witnesses 
In an adversarial system there is a clear requirement that defense counsel test the state’s 
case, but in theory it is not necessary to produce witnesses to establish reasonable doubt. In some 
jurisdictions there may be procedural advantages to presenting no evidence at all. Unlike static 
exculpatory documents, witnesses are unpredictable and are more easily impeached. Practically 
speaking, these may be valid reasons for not listing and presenting witnesses whose testimony is 
potentially exonerating. However, there is no sound strategic basis for failing to investigate and 
discover such witnesses in the first place. No decision can be made about whether calling 
witnesses is worth the risk if the witnesses are never located and evaluated. Yet in 87 cases19 
                                                     
19 J. Adams, R. Addison, R. Alowonle, R. Anderson, O. Anthony, M. Austin, B. Blake, L. Boyd, R. Bragg, M. 
Bravo, D. Brown, R. Buchli, S. Burgess, M. Caldwell, X. Catron, O. Cesar (1), O. Cesar (2), A. Chaparro, G. 
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(29.5%), such witnesses20 existed and were not pursued.  
• Darron Goods’ lawyer never interviewed the shooting victim in his 2005 Baltimore case, 
who was not called at the trial but later testified at a post-conviction hearing that Goods 
was not the assailant. The trial lawyer later explained that the omission was due to his 
inability to locate the victim, who was later discovered to have been in juvenile detention 
at the relevant time, telling a journalist that “it is the state’s obligation to bring in the 
victim anyway… I had no way to find him…”; the judge who granted Goods relief said 
the trial attorney “could have or should have” interviewed him pre-trial (Bykowicz, 
2005). 
 
• Kelvin Wiley was convicted of beating his girlfriend after his lawyer failed to locate 
helpful witnesses-- neighbors who saw another man enter the victim’s San Diego home 
before she was attacked inside. The judge who vacated Wiley’s conviction cited his 
lawyer’s failure to discover those witnesses through a competent investigation as grounds 
for relief (Alvord, 1992). Wiley’s appellate attorney blamed the prosecutor as well: "My 
own feeling is that the district attorney has an obligation to make sure a proper 
investigation is done.. They had a white girlfriend who said her black boyfriend did it, 
and they didn't feel they had to investigate any further" (qtd. in Alvord, 1992). 
 
Physical evidence 
Criminal defense lawyers have been criticized for their lack of facility with scientific 
                                                     
Chapman, T. E. Chumley, E. Coker, R. Connor, R. Cullipher, H. Cunningham, A. L. Day, Y. Eldridge, O. Engesser, 
J. Fritz, W. Goodman, D. Goods, C. Greene, P. Hampton, N. Harris, W. Harris, D. Helmig, M. Hernandez, B. P. 
Herrera, J. Herrera, S. Hogan, D. Howard, E. Hughes, J. Jackson (WA), T. Jasin, Juan Johnson, J. Kluppelberg, R. 
Knupp, D. Larsen, D. M. Lawrence, C. Livingston, G. Lopez, W. Lopez, F. Macias, P. P.  Magnan, M. McCormick, 
T. Merrill, Roberto Miranda, C. Mitchell, W. Nieves, M. Nnodimele, S. Ortiz, J. Palazollo, D. Paradis, M. Pardue, 
C. Parish, J. C. Pichardo, D. Polonia, D. Provience, J. Ramirez, W. Robles, M. Rocha, C. Roesser, L. K. Rojas, J. P. 
Rollin, A. Sifuentes, L. D. Sims, K. Stewart, J. Talamantez, P. Thompson, S. Thompson, J. Trulove, G. Valdez, E. 
Wagstaffe, V. Washington, H. Wells, J. Wheeler-Whichard, K. Wiley. 
20 Excluding alibi witnesses, which will be discussed in a separate section. 
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evidence. Jonakait (1991) famously posited that perhaps “attorneys are reasonably bright people 
who became lawyers partly because they were afraid of science and math… If so, lawyers will 
not examine the scientific evidence with as much skepticism as they would other information.” 
(p. 349). In 70 cases21 (23.7%), physical evidence was not fully investigated and either went 
unchallenged or unpresented.  
• After Jerry Jamaal Jones was accused of assaulting a cellmate, his trial attorney was 
provided with a handwritten journal of  the accuser in which he described how he was 
falsely implicating Jones (Stingl, 2011). The attorney explained his decision to disregard 
the journal and investigate no further: “I was suspicious of it from the beginning. No one 
in my experience keeps a diary in the jail and admits crimes in it” (qtd. in Stingl, 2011). 
A much less experienced post-conviction attorney had the journal examined by a 
handwriting expert who confirmed its authenticity, and Jones’ conviction was vacated 
(Stingl, 2011).  
 
Alibi evidence 
Alibi evidence was not properly investigated in 66 cases22 (22.4%). Alibi evidence can be 
incredibly powerful, but it can also backfire badly if it is uncorroborated or appears tainted in 
some way: “…disbelieved alibis are typically deemed to be deceitful, and thus are readily taken 
                                                     
21 O. Anthony, R. Appling, H. Baltrip, M. Bravo, J. R. Bromgard, S. Burgess, V. Caminata, L. Canen, E. Carter, O. 
Cesar (1), G. Chapman, D. Contee, C. R. Dexter, Jr., P. Dombrowski, G. Drennen, E. Esse, G. Ford, D. L. Gavitt, A. 
Golden, R. Gondor, Jennifer Hall, D. Hamilton, B. Harris, M. Hash, J. Hebshie, E. Hughes, E. Jackson-Knight, H. 
James, Juan Johnson, Jerry Jamaal Jones, D. Kelly, J. Kluppelberg, D. Larsen, K. F. Lee, C. Livingston, K. Martin, 
S. Mellen, J. Miller Jr., L. Montoya, S. V. Morales N. Ventura, N. Moreno, C. Munoz, L. Murray, G. Nelson, M. 
Nnodimele; C. Parish, L. Pettit, K. Register, R. Resh, J. Rodriguez, C. Roesser, P. Rose, J. Savory, L. Sinegal, G. 
Steidl, R. L. Stinson, W. Swift, J. Tomaino, S. Toney, J. Trulove, E. Truvia, G. Vann, Carl Veltmann, Christopher 
Veltmann, E. Washington, H. Whitlock, G. Wilhoit, James Williams, C. Wilson, R. D. Wyatt. 
22 R. Alvarez, J. Amrine, J. S. Anderson, M. Austin, C. Avery, E. Baker, J. Bass. A. Carmona, E. Carter, O. Cesar 
(1), M. Conteh, D. Corner, L. A. Day, P. Dombrowski, Ernesto Flores, Jr., D. Foster, J. Garcia, T. W. Gassman, R. 
Gondor, D. Hamilton, C. Harding, W. Harris, D. Helmig, J. Herrera, M. Hill, D. Hurt, Timothy Johnson, E. E. 
Larson, G. Lindstadt, W. Lopez, A. Luster, R. Madrigal, L. McGee,  H. Miller, C. Montgomery, L. Montgomery, J. 
Moore, G. Nelson, A. Ortiz, L. Palmer, C. Parish, Pavel, D. Polonia, C. Potts, E. Raby, Jr., S. Radillo, Jr., J. 
Ramirez, R. Resh, R. Ross, D. Ruby, J. Savory, A. Sifuentes, T. Simmons III, J. E. Smith, P. E. Statler, K. Stewart, 
D. Taylor, R. D. Thomas, E. Wagstaffe, J. Walker, W. Walker, B. Ward, V. Washington, M.  Weiner, J. Wheeler-
Whichard. 
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to imply guilt” (Simon, 2012, p. 163) (see also Garrett, 2011, pp. 156-158). Some alibi witnesses 
appear to be more effective than others for imputing actual innocence. Absent physical 
corroboration of the alibi (e.g., video footage, time cards), motivated familiars (relatives, friends 
and domestic partners) are the least convincing, while strangers and non-motivated familiars 
(such as personnel at a business one frequents) are most readily believed (Culhane & Hosch, 
2004; Hosch et al., 2011; Olson & Wells, 2004). Jurors may assume that a defendant’s family 
members and friends would fabricate to spare a loved one from being convicted. In some of the 
NRE ILD cases, weak alibi evidence was presented without the supporting material that would 
have made it much more convincing. In other cases, strong alibi evidence was never fully 
investigated in the first place. In one case, a patently false alibi was presented, undermining all 
credibility the defense may have otherwise enjoyed. 
Institutional alibis: 
• Jose Garcia was sentenced to 25 years to life for murder despite the fact that he was 
incarcerated in the Dominican Republic when the victim was killed in the Bronx. 
Although the victim’s sister testified for the defense that she had spoken to Garcia by 
telephone on the night of the murder, when she believed he was in the Matanzas jail, she 
was forced to acknowledge that she had not dialed the phone herself (Garcia v. 
Portuondo, 2006). The trial attorney cross-examined an eyewitness who had identified 
Garcia but presented no other witnesses or documents to corroborate the alibi (Garcia v. 
Portuondo, 2006). A United States Magistrate found that the failure to have an 
investigator seek police records and travel documents and to interview potential 
witnesses constituted ineffective assistance and the reviewing appellate court agreed: 
“His duty was to investigate, not to make do with whatever evidence fell into his lap.[fn 
omitted] …In failing to conduct any investigation at all, [his] performance at trial fell 
well below objective standards of reasonable representation” (Garcia v. Portuondo, 2006, 
p. 284). 
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Employment alibis: 
• Joshua Moore was working at a golf shop in Huntington Beach, California when a video 
store was robbed, but his attorney failed to develop the evidence that could prove his 
alibi, including two receipts—one of which bore Moore’s fingerprints (Possley 2012a). 
The lawyer acknowledged that he failed to contact two of Moore’s co-workers who could 
also verify his alibi, despite being aware of their potential testimony (Schou, 2011). 
Cynthia Moore, Joshua’s mother, said that, "When we hired him, he told me he knew 
how to handle the case--that he was an ex-DA and was confident he could get Josh off" 
(qtd. in Schou, 2011). 
Consumer alibis: 
• Carl Montgomery was purchasing a bicycle at Sears at the time of the crime he was 
accused of committing and had a receipt, but his lawyer failed to present the clerk’s 
disinterested and potentially highly persuasive testimony in court. Rather, he presented 
twelve close friends and relatives of Montgomery as his alibi witnesses, who were not 
believed by the jury. The appellate court, granting relief, court noted that the lawyer 
“testified that his failure was due to ‘inadvertence’ as well as the fact that he ‘simply 
didn’t believe’ [Montgomery]” (Montgomery v. Petersen, 1988, p. 412) and disapproved 
of the notion “that defense counsel's conclusory statement that he did not believe his 
client was an adequate basis for ignoring such an important lead. Indeed, if counsel had 
taken the few steps necessary to identify and interview the Sears clerk, he may well have 
formed a more favorable view of his client's veracity” (Montgomery v. Petersen, 1988, p. 
414). 
Backfiring alibis: 
• Ronald Ross testified that he had been watching an NBA basketball playoffs game when 
a shooting occurred, but was contradicted by prosecutors who entered evidence that the 
 26 
 
shooting occurred before the game. This could have been rebutted with the fact that a 
different playoffs game was being televised at the time in question, but his attorney failed 
to marshal that evidence in his defense and he was convicted (Possley, 2013a).  
Even worse, Donald Ruby’s lawyer presented an alibi witness who was flatly contradicted 
by documentary evidence showing that she was actually at work at the relevant time (Miller, 1993); 
it was only at his second trial that irrefutable evidence, based on blowfly eggs, was introduced to 
show that the murder occurred at a time when Ruby was 90 miles away (Possley, 2014b). An 
innocent defendant who lacks a strong alibi may be especially desperate to produce one. It is 
incumbent on defense attorneys not only to locate sound alibi evidence and any corroboration 
where it exists, but to vigorously test any proffered alibi evidence, as the prosecution likely will, 
and be certain it is above reproach before presenting it in court23. In the absence of full 
investigation, counsel may err by opening the door to damaging evidence against his own client. 
When that evidence is “so damaging to his client’s case that it may fatally taint the trial,” 
introducing it becomes a substantive violation of counsel’s duty to provide effective representation 
(Gershman, 1997, p. 268).  
 
Alternate suspects 
The SODDI (Some Other Dude Did It) defense, a term credited to Steven Lubet (1992), 
involves arguing or implying that the actual perpetrator is someone other than the defendant on 
trial. McCord (1995) refers to this as the “aaltperp” (alleged alternate perpetrator) strategy, and 
notes the hurdles that must be overcome to adduce such supporting evidence in court even where 
it exists24. When deployed without supporting evidence it tends to fail, and worse, subjects the 
theory of defense to mockery and derision by the prosecution in closing argument. Nonetheless, 
                                                     
23 See Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d 48 (2d Cir., 2005): “…it is ‘axiomatic’…that the presentation of false exculpatory 
evidence in general, and false alibi evidence in particular, is likely to be viewed by the jury as evincing 
consciousness of guilt” (p. 72). 
24 Some of the more onerous restrictions on introducing such evidence were invalidated in Holmes v. South Carolina 
(2006). 
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if sufficiently reliable, such evidence can be among the most persuasive in creating reasonable 
doubt and thus lead to acquittal or outright dismissal. The defense is never required to prove who 
actually committed a crime, but it is certainly helpful when possible. In 59 (20.0%) of the FTI 
cases25, credible evidence of alternate suspects was not fully investigated by defense attorneys 
before trial or plea.  
• Gilbert Amezquita was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for an aggravated assault in 
which a cell phone was stolen. Had his trial attorney contacted the people who were called 
from or used the phone after it was taken from the victim, at least one of whom was listed 
in a police report provided to the defense before trial, he would have discovered Gilbert 
Guerrero, the actual attacker. The trial attorney admitted that he had done nothing more 
than read a file on the case and did no independent investigation. Paid $2500 by 
Amezquita’s family, the trial attorney later told the press: "He was going to have a hard 
enough time (just) paying my fees. He did not have money for an investigator" (qtd. in 
McVicker & Khanna, 2003). 
In several cases, the failure to investigate an alternate suspect apparently stemmed from 
an ethical violation—lawyers operating under a conflict of interest in which they also 
represented or were retained by the alternate suspect26.  
 
Medical evidence 
Related to failures to properly investigate physical evidence, a common pattern seen in 53 
(18.0%) of the FTI cases27 was a failure to investigate the medical evidence that was used to 
                                                     
25 B. F. Allen, R. Alvarez, G. Amezquita, J. Amrine, O. Anthony, J. Bass, J. Bell, Jr., Debra Brown, R. Buchli II, M. 
Caldwell, A. Chaparro, G. Chapman, D. Clay, Sr., E. Daniels, R. Dudley, R. Gondor, K. Harris, W. Harris, M. Hash, 
D. Helmig, L. D. Jones, T. L. Jones, J. Kluppelberg, L. Lamb, D. Larsen, D. M. Lawrence, R. Leverett, G. Lopez, E. 
Lynn, R. Madrigal, P. P. Magnan,  B. Miller, Roberto Miranda, L. Montoya, N. Moreno, L. Murray, C. Parish, R. 
Perez, D. Polonia, C. Potts, S. Radillo, Jr., J. Ramirez, R. Resh, L. Roberts, R. Ross, S. Schulz, A. Sifuentes, L. 
Sinegal, K. Stewart, R. D. Thomas, A. Tiscareno, S. Toney, D. Tucker, E. Vamvakas, V. Washington, R. 
Williamson, S. Wilson, Yarbough. 
26 A. Chaparro, E. Daniels, L. D. Jones, N. Moreno. 
27 A. Baba-Ali, B. Baran, J. Baumer, R. Baylor, D. Bell, L. Boyd, B. Briggs, G. Chapman, D. Christoph, R. Coney, 
R. Cullipher, Y. Eldridge, L. Eze, J. Fritz, R. Greer, W. Hales, D. Hamilton, R. Hays, G. Lindstadt, D. Loveless, J. 
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inculpate defendants, or failure to develop such medical evidence when it was exculpatory in 
nature.  
• Debbie Loveless and her common law husband John Miller were convicted after her 4-
year-old daughter was killed in a brutal attack. The child had actually been bitten by a 
dog, as the pair claimed, but their attorneys failed to discover medical records indicating 
that wounds which appeared to have been caused by a knife were actually caused by a 
surgeon’s scalpel; in attempting to save the child’s life, tissue damaged by the dog’s teeth 
had been cleanly excised. As well, autopsy photographs showed a paw print on the 
child’s back (Possley, 2015b; Possley, 2015c). Among the findings of fact of the trial 
court which ultimately granted relief were that Miller’s trial attorney “did not pursue the 
dog defense theory because the State’s attorney told him the dogs were only ‘puppies’” 
and that neither of the privately retained attorneys for Loveless and Miller shared autopsy 
photos with a qualified expert (qtd. in FitzGerald, 1994).  
A number of defendants were convicted after their attorneys failed to develop medical 
evidence to dispute diagnoses of Shaken Baby Syndrome28. Another group of defendants was 
convicted of child sex abuse even though medical evidence suggested no assaults had occurred29 
Robert Coney and Leroy Orange (see also Bogira, 2005) were convicted based on their false 
confessions, despite available medical evidence demonstrating that they had been physically 
brutalized while in custody of police interrogators. 
 
Discovery material 
Requesting and closely examining discovery material from the prosecution is the most 
                                                     
Miller, S. V. Morales, N. Moreno, L. Murray, D. Okongwu, L. Orange, H. Overton, D. Paradis, M. Parker, K. Pavel, 
S. Ralston, J. Ramos, N. Rhoades, J. P. Rollin, D. Ruby, P. Stallings, G. Steidl, A. Tiscareno, D. Tucker, G. Vann, 
Carl Veltmann, Christopher Veltmann, M. Verkullen, M. Ware, M. Weiner, H. Whitlock, J. Willett, Emmaline 
Williams, S. Wilson, J. Wosu, A. Yarbough, E. Zimmerman. 
28 J. Baumer, W. Hales, S. Ralston, A. Tiscareno, M. Ware. 
29 L. Eze, R. Hays, G. Lindstadt, D. Okongwu, M. Parker, K. Pavel, J. Ramos, Emmaline Williams, James Williams, 
J. Wosu. 
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basic element of investigating the state’s evidence, but that was not done in 48 (16.3%) of the 
FTI cases30.  
• David Tucker’s trial lawyer testified in postconviction that his lack of knowledge that the 
victim had identified another person as the man who beat him was the result of his failure 
to ask for police reports; he “had trusted the prosecution to provide him with relevant 
documents and he had not requested police investigation reports” (Tucker v. Prelesnik, 
1999, p. 751). 
 
• Rafael Madrigal’s trial attorney did not transcribe audiotapes he received from the 
prosecution despite having been granted a continuance to examine them, so he never 
learned that they contained valuable exculpatory evidence. Additionally, he ignored 
reports of interviews conducted by a public defender investigator, contained in the file he 
received from that office when he took over the case, that could have led to testimony 
from his supervisor establishing that Madrigal was at work at the time of the offense 
(Madrigal v. Yates, 2009). 
 
Crime scene 
In 16 (5.4%) of the FTI cases31, a visit to the crime scene would have revealed that the 
state’s theory of the defendant’s guilt was impossible or highly unlikely, but that was not done 
by a member of the defense team until postconviction. All of these cases involved inculpatory 
eyewitnesses who could have been effectively discredited—they simply could not have seen 
                                                     
30 R. Alowonle, A. Baba-Ali, B. Baran, R. Baylor, J. Becerra, J. Bell, Jr., R. Buchli II, E. Carter, G. Chapman, E. 
Coker, R. Connor, R. Cullipher, O. Engesser, R. Gondor, C. Greene, C. Harding, D. Helmig, H. James, D. Larsen, 
R. Leverett, E. J. Lloyd, W. Lopez, R. Madrigal, K. Martin, T. Mason, B. McLaughlin, A. Morris, M. Nnodimele, J. 
C. Pichardo, C. Potts, R. Resh, S. Rigel, C. Roesser, P. Rose, W. Swift, D. Talley, D. Terens, C. Thomas, D. Tice, 
D. Tucker, E. Wagstaffe, E. Washington, V. Washington, H. Wells, Antonio Williams, Emmaline Williams, S. 
Wilson, A. Yarbough. 
31 R. Addison, O. Anthony, G. Bright, M. Caldwell, J. Garcia, G. Gathers, D. Howard, John Jackson, Terrell 
Johnson, J. Kluppelberg, F. Macias, K. Mitchell, K. Register, J. Talamantez, E. Truvia, Emmaline Williams.  
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what they claimed to see from their stated vantage point.  
John Jackson was represented by a private attorney who received a flat fee for all his 
work on public defense cases. When answering allegations of neglect by a different client, the 
attorney argued that the client “believes my role is to find proof that he's innocent of this 
particular charge. I've explained to him the role, or my role, is to see his constitutional rights are 
protected" and yet conceptualized that role as that of a referee rather than that of an advocate 
(qtd. in Armstrong, Davila, and Mayo, 2004). The judge that granted Jackson’s writ of habeas 
corpus said the attorney’s failure to visit the crime scene amounted to the omission of a 
“fundamental task” and, combined with his other failures to challenge the state’s inculpatory 
facts, constituted ineffective assistance (Armstrong, Davila, and Mayo, 2004). The judge 
admonished that the attorney: “those are the facts that you begin with, not the facts you end 
with" (qtd. in Armstrong, Davila, and Mayo, 2004). 
 
DNA evidence 
DNA evidence has been heralded as a “truth machine” (Kreimer, 2005)32, but it was not 
properly investigated in 14 (4.7%) cases33 of exonerees convicted in the DNA era (1990 or later). 
In eight cases, defense attorneys did not request that biological evidence be tested for DNA. 
Cheydrick Britt was convicted in Florida in 2004 but the DNA testing that exonerated him was 
not done until 2013 (Possley, 2013b). In another case, that of Lafonso Rollins in Illinois, 
exculpatory DNA test results sat in the state’s crime lab but were never requested by his lawyer 
(Center on Wrongful Convictions, c. 2102a).  In two other cases, DNA testing was done 
incorrectly or results were described deceptively by the state’s analysts. The testing done in 
Randall Mills’ 1999 sexual assault case actually excluded him, but his attorney failed to discover 
this (Possley, 2014c). In Florida, Jesse Miller Jr. was convicted at his first two trials in large part 
                                                     
32 The assertion that DNA evidence constitutes a “truth machine” is highly problematic (Aronson & Cole, 2009), but 
it is nonetheless quite convincing to juries. 
33 G. Amezquita, D. Boyce, M. Bravo, C. Britt, W. Cservak, R. Gondor, A. Hicks, Richard Johnson, J. Miller, Jr., R. 
Mills, L. Montoya, C. Parish, R. Resh, L. Rollins. 
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on the basis of DNA evidence that state experts claimed incontrovertibly placed Miller at the 
crime scene, but was acquitted at his third trial after his new attorney hired an independent expert 
to challenge the flawed DNA examination done by the state’s analyst (Duret, 2014; Freeman, 
2014). 
 
Client’s mental status and psychological background 
Most of the 12 (4.1%) FTI cases in this category34 involve defendants who made 
incriminating statements as a result of their mental illness or intellectual disability.  
• Dayna Christoph, a juvenile, confessed to sexually abusing her younger sister and was 
convicted; the Washington Court of Appeals found that “a minimally adequate 
investigation would have discovered Ms. Christoph’s documented long-term mental and 
emotional difficulties and sufficient exculpatory evidence to warrant dismissal of the 
charge of the information, or at the very least, to support a plea bargain for reduced 
charges”; Christoph’s lawyer devoted less than two hours to her case (State v. Christoph, 
p. 4, 2000). 
 
Client’s criminal history 
In nine cases35 (3.1%), trial attorneys failed to investigate their clients’ criminal records, 
thus crippling their defenses.  
• Alexander Hebrard pleaded guilty to illegal possession of a firearm, despite the fact that 
the underlying felony charge which would have made him ineligible to possess such a 
weapon had actually been dismissed prior to his plea (Possley, 2013c).  
 
                                                     
34 A. Carmona, B. Chen, D. Christoph, E. Coker, R. Cullipher, H. Cunningham, B. Harris, E. J. Lloyd, L. Montoya, 
S. Ortiz, C. Stonehouse, R. Williamson. 
35 L. Acero, J. S. Anderson, C. Eason, G. Ford, J. Garcia, A. Hebrard, B. Henly, L. Montgomery, S. A. Rivera, 
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Client’s physical condition 
In five cases36 (1.7%), the physical condition of the defendants was inconsistent with 
their guilt, but their attorneys failed to develop the evidence that might have exonerated them on 
those grounds. Anselmo Aviles was suffering injuries from a motor vehicle accident and was on 
crutches on the day of a 1988 home invasion he was charged with, but his attorney failed to 
obtain and present the medical records and testimony of his doctors that proved this (Possley, 
2012b). Harry Miller was recovering from a recent stroke in December 2000 when a woman was 
robbed by an assailant wielding a knife, in another state, but none of his caregivers were called 
to testify and he was convicted (Denzel, c. 2012a). Cherice Thomas was legally blind and would 
have had great difficulty executing the shooting that she was convicted of without her glasses, 
not worn by the perpetrator, but her lawyer did not pursue that evidence in her defense (Possley, 
2013d). 
 
Client’s cultural and linguistic background 
In two cases37 (0.7%), attorneys failed to investigate the ways in which their clients’ 
particular cultural backgrounds might have manifested a false appearance of guilt and failed to 
obtain effective translators. Anthropologists could have been called to explain how the cultures 
and languages of Boping Chen (Chinese) and Santiago Morales (Mixtec) might have influenced 
their respective demeanors and occluded their understandings of critical court proceedings 
(Possley, 2012c; Possley, c. 2012a). 
 
Conclusion: The power of comprehensive pre-trial defense investigation 
In trying to discern some greater meaning from these categories of investigative failure, 
what I find most notable is that the largest incidence occur in arenas that fall most clearly outside 
the trial lawyer’s traditional skill set: interviewing witnesses and recognizing issues surrounding 
                                                     
36 A. Aviles, N. Brown, H. Miller, S. Rigel, C. Thomas. 
37 B. Chen, S. V. Morales. 
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scientific evidence. In contrast to the relatively small number of investigative failures that might 
be described as a complete abdication (such as failing to request discovery materials), the 
investigative failures in my sample were mostly of the type that might be expected to result when 
lawyers operate without the necessary assistance.  
In addition, though the vast majority of cases described here were not death penalty 
cases, the categories of investigative failure track closely with the specific tasks that ABA (2003) 
guidelines require for capital guilt phase investigation: obtaining discovery, interviewing 
potential witnesses, examining physical evidence, viewing the crime scene, and exploring the 
client’s background as it relates to culpability. Investigations that comport with this high 
standard were necessary in these cases, but did not occur.  
The power of comprehensive fact investigation 
Attempting to apply facts learned later to a particular moment in time and place when a 
defendant was being tried is inherently problematic. Although I tried to be conservative about 
categorizing cases as ones in which the evidence that helped free a defendant in postconviction 
would have done so at the trial level, I imagined a counterfactual in which reasonable and 
impartial jurors heard and weighed the evidence and were not unduly influenced by extralegal 
factors. It may be that the jurists who granted relief in these cases were more amenable to 
evidence of innocence than lay persons drawn from communities affected by crimes that were 
frequently shocking in nature. On the other hand, the burden of proof shifts from the state to the 
defendant at the appellate level, so it may be that these factors tend to balance each other out. 
And many of the defendants were retried by juries that acquitted them when the previously 
undiscovered evidence was finally presented, though perhaps by more gifted trial attorneys than 
those they initially received. 
In order to address the final research question, it was necessary to make a subjective 
judgment about whether a proper investigation would likely have prevented those wrongful 
convictions where an investigative failure had been present. Here I tried to be conservative, 
erring on the side of answering in the negative. For instance, where alibi evidence was first 
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presented in postconviction proceedings along with other newly discovered evidence of 
innocence, I did not assume that the alibi evidence presented at trial alone would have been 
sufficient to prevent conviction unless it was strongly corroborated (e.g., the individual was 
indisputably incarcerated at the time of the crime or had other unassailable proof). If an 
exoneration came about because of a long-delayed recantation, confession by an alternate 
suspect, DNA testing that was unavailable at the time of trial, or some other extraordinary event, 
I did not deem the failure to investigate a relatively inconsequential piece of exculpatory 
evidence as a case where having done so would likely have prevented the conviction.  
In 16 cases the unexplored evidence probably would not have made a difference in light 
of other circumstances of the case. For example, while Daniel Taylor’s lawyer failed to discover 
that one of the police officers whose testimony was critical in rebutting his alibi had been 
accused by a judge of lying in court four months earlier, along with other evidence supporting 
the alibi, a local newspaper was able to do just that (Possley, 2014d). But in light of the fact that 
Taylor had confessed, along with a number of other youths who implicated him as well as 
themselves (Possley, 2014d), it seems unlikely that such evidence would have prevented his 
conviction. His exoneration came only after the Illinois Attorney General’s Office found that the 
state’s attorney had withheld evidence that seven police officers had actually confirmed Taylor’s 
alibi (including two who had testified otherwise at his trial) (Possley, 2014d); no amount of 
diligent defense investigation was likely to have dislodged that evidence in the absence of the 
Attorney General’s review. 
In 53 cases I was not confident to make a determination, either because it did not seem 
clear based on the available information or because I believed the case was simply too close to 
call. Joy Wosu’s case is an example of one involving circumstances in which I felt no definitive 
judgment could be made. Wosu was convicted of sexually abusing two twin seven-year old girls, 
who claimed she had assaulted them at their birthday party (Possley, 2015d). Her attorney failed 
to investigate medical evidence that scarring in the girls’ genital regions pre-dated the accusation 
or to introduce available testimony that hymenal scarring was not a valid indicator of abuse 
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(Possley, 2015d). Sixteen years later her conviction was overturned on precisely those grounds 
(Possley, 2015d), yet at the time of Wosu’s 1993 trial, the mantra of the day was “we believe the 
children” (see Coleman & Clancy, 1990; Moston, 1990). In 1993, the jury might well have 
agreed with that sentiment, even with the medical evidence in Wosu’s favor. 
On the other end of the spectrum, it seems reasonably clear that some types of 
evidence—evidence that in all probability would have been uncovered by a comprehensive pre-
trial investigation--would have been quite convincingly exculpatory if not fully dispositive in 
many of these cases. Police officers claimed that Jeanie Becerra and Arthur Morris obstructed 
and assaulted them when the officers were summoned to the couple’s home in Topeka, Kansas in 
2014 (Possley, 2015e; Possley, 2015f). Video of the incident was provided to defense attorneys 
just before trial but was not viewed at the time (Possley, 2015e; Possley, 2015f). After the trial, a 
prosecutor discovered that the video showed no illegal behavior on the part of Becerra and 
Morris (Possley, 2015e; Possley, 2015f). Had the attorney viewed the evidence prior to trial, it 
seems likely the case would have been dismissed outright. In another case, the names of two 
witnesses to a fatal accident were listed in a police report, but the substance of their exculpatory 
statements were not included in the report (Possley, 2015g). They were never interviewed by 
Oakley Engesser’s defense team before his trial for manslaughter and were not called to testify 
(Possley, 2015g). It seems reasonable to conclude that if they had been, he would probably not 
have been convicted. 
Of the 295 cases where FTI was present, 226 met my criteria for those in which a 
comprehensive defense investigation might well have prevented the conviction (See Appendix 
B., pp. 60-65).  This is a subjective evaluation in a preliminary study. Nonetheless, based on my 
analysis, 13.8 percent of the first 1,635 wrongful convictions documented in the NRE might 
plausibly have been avoided if the core defense function of fact investigation had been carried 
out in a more robust fashion.  
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Chapter 2: Discussion 
Losing our (clients’) innocence 
In most of the cases examined here, we can learn the basic details of a breakdown that 
occurred but not necessarily why it occurred. Whether the result of inexperience, willfully 
insufficient diligence, lack of resources or some less tangible process in which the presumption 
of innocence was abandoned by an advocate at the outset, these data offer incomplete answers. It 
is simply not possible to attribute a cause of the failure to investigate in the majority of cases, 
although some case materials do provide an explanation. Insufficient funding is a well-known 
fundamental and perennial problem. In Texas, Federico Macias’ attorneys were compensated 
with a flat fee that amounted $11.84 per hour and $500 total was allotted to his investigator 
(Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 1991). As the judge who granted him a new trial wrote: “The errors 
that occurred in this case are inherent in a system which paid attorneys such a meager amount… 
investigators fared no better” (Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 1991, pp. 789-790). In 1985, Eddie 
Joe Lloyd’s appointed attorney in Detroit was given a mere $150 for preparation and 
investigation (Innocence Project, Inc., c. 2012). Some of the failures to initiate proper 
investigations were at least partially the result of inexperience: Kia Stewart was represented by a 
group of Tulane Law School students and a professor who had never conducted a murder 
defense (Possley, 2015h). Caseload or other systemic pressures were apparent in the defense of 
Robert Lee Stinson, whose lawyer had only been on his case for two weeks before he was tried 
(Innocence Project, Inc., 2014). In a few cases, such as that of Kenneth Pavel (Pavel v. Hollins, 
2001), lawyers incorrectly believed that the state’s evidence was so weak that there was no need 
to mount a zealous defense. And in some, there is indication of the belief that a guilty client was 
not worth the investment required for of a full investigation. Carl Montgomery’s lawyer made 
little effort to investigate disinterested alibi evidence, later saying, he “simply didn’t believe” his 
client (qtd. in Montgomery v. Petersen, 1988, p. 412).  
Much has been written about the resource constraints that hobble the provision of 
indigent defense, but there may be more nebulous cultural and psychological processes at work 
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as well. There is a large body of research describing how tunnel vision and cognitive biases on 
the part of police and prosecutors may lead those actors to develop a theory of guilt and discard 
any evidence that does not conform. Martin (2001) defines tunnel vision in the criminal justice 
system as “a set of preconceptions and heuristics that causes police investigators to select 
evidence to build a case for the conviction of their chosen suspect while suppressing or ignoring 
information and interpretations that point away from guilt” (p. 848).  Confirmation bias, defined 
most simply as the tendency to seek and favor confirmation of a pre-existing belief or hypothesis 
(Nickerson, 1998), easily leads to tunnel vision and may be responsible for this tendency toward 
inculpation. In addition to the general human tendency toward confirmation bias, police 
investigators experience specific institutional pressures that steer that bias forcefully in the 
direction of clearing cases and assisting prosecutors to obtain convictions (Simon, 2012). 
Defenders, particularly those who represent the indigent, also face institutional pressures to clear 
cases and resolve docket backlogs and may be similarly susceptible (Findley & Scott, 2006), if to 
a lesser degree. Adele Bernhard (2001) contends that, “Another reason for the poor quality of 
criminal defense services is the unacknowledged but pervasive belief of all participants in the 
criminal justice system—even criminal defense attorneys—that anyone who has been arrested is 
guilty” (p. 232).  
An interesting finding from Gould and colleagues (2014) was that any prior criminal 
history increased the risk of an erroneous conviction, even when the past conviction or arrest was 
incongruous with the instant charge. This suggests something other than a rational reliance on 
specific and idiosyncratic past behavior as a possible indicator of more recent behavior but, 
rather, that criminal legal system practitioners may be using mental shortcuts to make guesses 
about potential guilt or innocence and that these determinations may have a perverse effect on 
outcomes: “If the defendant has no criminal record, the police are more likely to view 
inculpatory evidence with skepticism, arguing that this is not the type of person who is likely to 
commit a crime. They are more likely to investigate whether a mistake has been made” (Gould et 
al., 2014, p. 498). Defense attorneys may make similar calculations, and this could have an 
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especially detrimental effect on the poor and people of color. Selection bias resulting from police 
discretion about whom to arrest, especially for minor crimes, may be amplified at later stages of 
the process and accumulate along the way to case disposition. Rationing of investigative 
resources by indigent defenders based on prior record is yet another potential point where 
disadvantage may manifest in criminal case processing.    
Gould et al.’s (2014) study is interesting in another way as well. The authors compared 
260 erroneous convictions with 200 “near misses” in which a person was charged but either had 
his case dismissed (91%) or was acquitted at trial (9%). By using these “near misses” as a 
matched control sample, they were able to identify statistically significant factors that predicted 
erroneous conviction (Gould et al., 2014). Gould and colleagues (2014) found that “weak 
defense” (involving “defense attorneys who had serious conflicts of interest, who did not bother 
to prepare opening and closing statements, or who did not have the education or funds to enlist 
the help of an expert” [Gould et al., 2014, p. 502]) was indeed a predictor of erroneous 
conviction. Examining the underlying data from this study, in order to determine what defense 
investigation efforts were undertaken, and by which personnel, in the “near misses” as compared 
to the erroneous convictions, could provide valuable information. As well, it could be useful to 
compare conviction rates in public defender offices with staff investigators carrying reasonable 
caseloads to those without, although it might be very difficult to isolate the investigator effect 
amid the confounding factor of highly punitive legal culture (which likely accompanies 
extremely constrained defense resources) resulting in high multicollinearity, and few offices 
likely have truly sufficient investigative support. Another approach is to conduct ethnographic 
research at carefully selected public defense provider sites. Significant resources would be 
required to successfully carry out such a project, but the potential for gaining fine-grained 
insights about the cultural and psychological barriers to effective defense investigation, beyond 
the well-known resource constraint problems, could conceivably justify such an investment.  
Changing prevailing professional norms 
According to Benner (2009), criminal justice systems “have forgotten their primary 
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mission and increasingly operate under a presumption of guilt… where processing the ‘presumed 
guilty’ as cheaply as possible has been made a higher priority than investigating the possibility of 
innocence” (p. 267). Forty years ago, Judge David Bazelon (1973) wrote that the reluctance to 
reverse convictions stemmed from judges’ belief that most defendants are guilty—what he called 
“’guilty anyway’ syndrome” (p. 26). The belief that everyone is guilty means that judges accept 
pleas without worrying about their factual basis or whether any defense investigation has been 
done, and some defense attorneys also suffer from the presumption that their clients are generally 
guilty (Guggenheim, 2012). The impact of Wiggins may have been less than some observers had 
hoped, but it was certainly remarkable in one way: it explicitly relied on ABA standards as 
governing the analysis of the reasonableness of counsel’s performance38 (Rigg, 2007). Those 
standards make clear that investigation must be done even if there is evidence suggestive of guilt, 
even in non-capital cases. Defense attorneys need to fully internalize this principle: “[i]f defense 
attorneys presume their client is guilty based on little more than a police report, and do not 
conduct an independent investigation,” (Benner, 2009, p. 332) then law enforcement 
investigators become the arbiters of guilt. In comparison to the work on police and prosecutors’ 
inculpation biases (see Simon, 2012), there is relatively scant literature examining the ways in 
which members of the defense bar may also be propelled toward the belief that the most of their 
clients are probably guilty, causing them to overlook innocence as a result, and how unconscious 
race and class biases may be implicated in such processes (see Richardson & Goff, 2013).  
“[W]ithout facts at their disposal, defense counsel have to make their determinations on 
impressions made by the defendants. These impressions may well be influenced by 
misunderstandings that are a function of the social distance that separates middle-class 
professionals from the lower strata of society” (Scheingold, 2010, p. 312). Legal education that 
stresses the importance of fact investigation along with teaching culturally competent approaches 
                                                     
38 In contrast with Strickland, where the Court held that ABA guidelines “are guides to determining what is 
reasonable, but they are only guides” (1984, p. 688). 
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to representing indigent clients (see Archer, 2013; Holdman & Seeds, 2008; Lopez, 2008) could 
potentially help mitigate the “everyone’s guilty” attitude that may afflict some defenders. 
Recently, the Michigan State Appellate Defender Office (2014) specifically sought to hire a 
lawyer who possessed a “’streetwise’ instinct beyond the law for the facts surrounding a 
conviction.” Relying on investigators, who occupy a considerably less privileged social and 
professional position than those who hold law degrees, is perhaps an even more direct way to 
bridge the chasm between indigent clients and most of their defenders. According to one public 
defense investigator in North Carolina: “Investigators can bridge the gap with clients. It’s not 
that attorneys can’t communicate … but sometimes the title gets in the way. As an investigator, I 
can go in with a different approach and relate on different level” (qtd. in Lee, Hamblin, & Via, 
2019, p. 17). Not only are investigators paid at lower rates than attorneys39, but a little 
investigation can go a very long way. Many of the convictions described above could likely have 
been prevented with even a minor investment of investigative resources. It would not have taken 
much effort to learn that LaDondrell Montgomery was in jail on an unrelated arrest when his 
crime of conviction occurred (Possley, c. 2012b), or that Longino Acero was not required to 
register as a sex offender (Possley, 2014e).  
Who needs an investigator? 
Lack of zealous and effective representation is a huge systemic problem for indigent 
defense; it is a crisis that has been apparent for decades. The consequences to defendants who 
have been falsely accused, it might be asserted, stem as much from anemic fact-finding processes 
as from limited or unexercised legal expertise. My findings are consistent with such an assertion, 
with the caveats and limitations noted above. Investigative failures were by far the most frequent 
type of failure in the NRE ILD cases-- appearing in 80.6% of cases-- and in 43% of those cases, 
                                                     
39 The highest paid line investigator in the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office earns nearly $6,000 less per 
annum than the salary paid to a starting Deputy Public Defender ($92,928 and $98,514 respectively) (San Francisco 
Public Defender, 2015). In Los Angeles, the highest paid line investigator earns $112,548 annually, while a Deputy 
Public Defender with four years’ experience earns $167,388 (Los Angeles County Department of Human Resources, 
2015). In Florida, investigators hired through the Capital Case Registry receive $40.00 per hour in comparison with 
$100.00 per hour for appointed attorneys (Commission on Capital Cases, 2015). 
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the failures were solely investigative. A competent defense investigation can forestall 
overcharging and excessive punishment as well as lay groundwork for dismissals and acquittals. 
Yet the defense investigator remains largely invisible to the public, and occupies a relatively 
marginalized role within the criminal defense profession. Uphoff (2006) describes what happens 
when investigators are scarce within public defender offices: “I worked at the public defender 
office in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in the early 1980s. We had six investigators for about forty 
lawyers. That means each lawyer could use an investigator only on selected cases—those that 
were most serious and most likely to be tried” (fn 298, pp. 781-782).  
Likewise, the lack of investigators is often not mentioned in conversations about the 
crises in indigent defense. Despite Peng’s (2015) description of the severe threat to liberty posed 
by overburdened investigators, and despite the fact that her boss Derwyn Del Bunton (2016) 
specifically cited the inability of his office to develop exculpatory evidence when he began 
refusing new cases, a recent workload study of public defenders in Louisiana did not address the 
issue of investigators at all (Postlethwaite & Netterville, APAC, 2017). The Louisiana study, 
using the Delphi method40, concluded that the state required 1,769 full-time public defenders to 
adequately represent its public defender-eligible defendants, yet it had only 363—clearly a 
critical shortage (Postlethwaite & Netterville, APAC, 2017). The respondents, in making their 
estimates of time required for different types of cases, were told to “presume adequate 
investigative, secretarial and other support services” (Postlethwaite & Netterville, APAC, 2017, 
p. 17). How would these estimates of the number of lawyers and lawyer hours that were needed 
have changed if the assumption was that investigative resources in Louisiana were not adequate, 
as they almost certainly are not? Staffing 1,769 lawyers based on the recommended ratio of one 
investigator to every three lawyers would require that there be 590 investigators to work with 
them. But we do not know from this report if there are even the 121 investigators that would be 
needed to presume adequate support for the 363 public defenders Louisiana currently employs. 
                                                     
40 The Delphi method involves iterative surveying of subject experts to achieve consensus regarding the item of 
inquiry; Postlethwaite & Netterville (2017) surveyed 65 private defense practitioners and 60 public defenders in 
Louisiana.  
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We only learn that there are 168 total support staff in the state, because investigators did not 
comprise a separate category and were collapsed along with support staff (legal secretaries, 
paralegals, etc.) (Postlethwaite & Netterville, APAC, 2017). In an encouraging development, a 
more recent workload study employing a similar methodology did look specifically at the level 
of investigator staffing in the North Carolina public defense system (Lee, Hamblin & Via, 2019). 
The study concluded that adequate staffing of investigators would require an additional 139 
investigators be hired, an increase of 223 percent, compared with a need for 73 percent more 
lawyers (Lee, Hamblin & Via, 2019). Investigators who were interviewed by Lee and colleagues 
said that “they can often explain the evidence to clients more effectively than an attorney” (Lee, 
Hamblin, & Via, 2019, p. 16), and the authors concluded that, “In many cases, the mere fact that 
they are represented by a defense team that includes an investigator, rather than a solitary 
attorney, helps to bolster the client’s confidence in the representation, leading to better 
communication” (Lee, Hamblin & Via, 2019, p. 16) 
As Bowman (1970) notes, “Not only is an attorney unskilled in investigative methods, 
but he lacks the time to expend in thorough investigation” (p. 634, fn14). The skills and 
temperament required of a successful investigator may not be present in all attorneys, yet it is 
considered acceptable and even expected by the courts41 (and some lawyers) for defense 
attorneys to conduct their own fact investigations unless there is some exceptional need for 
investigative assistance, such as in a capital case. The ABA (2003) guidelines for death penalty 
cases insist that the defense team include a “professional investigator” (p. 925) (along with a 
mitigation specialist), but the ABA’s (1993) Defense Function Standards imply that use of 
                                                     
41 Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) held that indigent defendants were entitled to the “raw materials” and “basic tools” of an 
effective defense (p. 77). But as Blume and Johnson (2013) note, “…since Ake, most courts have interpreted ‘basic 
tools’ to mean an investigative or expert service that is absolutely necessary to the defense. This is a showing that is 
frequently impossible to make without access to [those] very services…” (p. 2144). See also Groendyke (2007). 
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investigators is optional42. In contrast, prosecutors have a vast array of investigative assistance at 
their command, including police and in-house investigators, crime laboratory analysts, and 
medical examiners (Blume & Johnson, 2013). In denying the appeal of Sabrina Butler, who was 
later exonerated from Mississippi’s death row, the state Supreme Court held that she had “failed 
to show ‘substantial need’ for an investigator… Why should an investigator be necessary to 
perform tasks an attorney ordinarily performs?” (Butler v. State of Mississippi, 1992, p. 9). 
Conflating the roles of lawyer and investigator, as a legal norm, ensures that requests for funds 
earmarked for investigators will continue to encounter such resistance.  
Learning to think like a lawyer is not necessarily good practice for acting as an 
investigator. Legal thinking trains focus on legally relevant factors, but effective investigators 
navigate a less ordered sphere, pursuing tangents and conversations that may meander but that 
serve to establish rapport and sometimes lead to revelation. Many of the people who need to be 
interviewed in criminal cases have had unpleasant experiences with the legal system and distrust 
or even despise lawyers; an investigator can serve as a buffer between witnesses and the formal 
legal process. There are structural reasons to use investigators as well. As Miller (2003) points 
out, attorneys generally cannot testify and Steiner (1981) notes that “tremendous problems result 
when the lawyer is the only available possible impeaching witness” (p. 543) (see also fn42). Yet 
of those attorneys surveyed by Lowenthal (1981) who did conduct witness interviews, only 54.4 
percent had a third party present (Steiner, 1981). A prosecutor who conducts his own pre-
indictment investigation rather than relying on the police puts his absolute immunity in jeopardy 
                                                     
42 “Standard 4- 4.3 Relations With Prospective Witnesses: …(c) It is not necessary for defense counsel or defense 
counsel's investigator, in interviewing a prospective witness, to caution the witness concerning possible self-
incrimination and the need for counsel... (e) Unless defense counsel is prepared to forgo impeachment of a witness 
by counsel's own testimony as to what the witness stated in an interview or to seek leave to withdraw from the case 
in order to present such impeaching testimony, defense counsel should avoid interviewing a prospective witness 
except in the presence of a third person.” ©1993 by the American Bar Association.  Reprinted with permission.  All 
rights reserved.  This information or any or portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any 
means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American 
Bar Association. See also fn4. 
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should he misstep43 (see Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 1993; Imbler v. Pachtman, 1976; Fields v. 
Wharrie, 2014). It is worth noting here that, despite the problems with generalizing from the 
NRE cases, a large number of the 295 FTI cases featured failures to interview lay witnesses, the 
task that most requires an investigator. Lyon & Smith (2014) assert that most criminal cases 
“demand the involvement of [defense] investigators” (p. 22).  
As late as 2017, a newspaper’s investigation found that many court-appointed defense 
lawyers in Wisconsin rarely worked with investigators, even in the most serious cases 
(Carpenter, 2017). The paper found that about 100 attorneys had accepted at least 50 felony case 
appointments without requesting funds for an investigator, and some lawyers had worked as 
many as 300 cases without investigator assistance. Past-president of the Wisconsin Association 
of Criminal Defense Lawyers Bill Mansell told the paper: “A minor felony is not a minor 
thing… I don’t know what sort of felony cases you could have that wouldn’t require some sort of 
investigative work,’ Mansell said. ‘That’s unimaginable to me.’” (qtd. in Carpenter, 2017). Ellen 
Henak, an appellate lawyer and officer of the Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers, shared her opinion as well: “…any case that has any real complexity is going to require 
an investigator for something” (qtd. in Carpenter, 2017).  
Evolving standards 
The right to state-paid counsel created by Powell once applied only to capital cases but has 
been elaborated through subsequent holdings to apply to any case in which imprisonment is a 
possible penalty; in order to prevent wrongful convictions in many more kinds of cases it would 
be wise to follow the path laid out by the standards for death penalty guilt phase investigation in 
non-capital cases as well. Ten years after Strickland, Stephen Bright (1994) remarked that, 
“Providing better representation today than the [Powell] defendants had in Scottsboro in 1931 
requires money, a structure for providing indigent defense that is independent of the judiciary and 
                                                     
43 The principle is that when acting as an investigator before a finding of probable cause has been made, a prosecutor 
should only enjoy the qualified immunity endowed upon police; it does not mean prosecutors should never conduct 
investigations. It does include a logic of distinguishing the investigative and advocatory functions. 
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prosecution, and skilled and dedicated lawyers” (p. 1836). I would submit that, to an extent perhaps 
not fully appreciated, it also requires skilled and dedicated investigators, and that one way to 
optimize indigent defense resources is to rely more on them; they should not be seen as luxuries 
to be reserved for serious felonies. The capital defense bar appears to have made great strides in 
elevating its prevailing professional norms44. As Bowman (1970) argued long ago, “Although the 
defendant accused of a capital crime presents the most serious case due to the possible punishment, 
there is no logic in withholding [expert and investigational] aid from persons facing lesser degrees 
of official sanctions. The same rationale that led to granting counsel in a broad range of cases is 
applicable to additional assistance” (p. 636, fn29).  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
44 As one example, between 1989 and 1997, attorneys spent an average of 1,889 hours per federal death penalty 
trial; for the period covering 1998 through 2004, the figure had climbed to 3,557 hours (Gould & Greenman, 2010).  
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Appendix A.  
 
Examples of forms of investigative failures 
 
Inculpatory witnesses 
Criminal history: 
• A man who accused Magilie Conteh of robbing him could have been impeached with a 
prior conviction for a crime of dishonesty, but the trial attorney took the prosecutor’s 
word for it when told the victim had no record (Jouvenal, 2013). 
 
• Kash Register was implicated by a neighbor whose criminal record included, among 
other crimes of dishonesty, an arrest for forgery less than a week before the murder for 
which Register was convicted (Possley, 2013e). 
 
Reputation for dishonesty or mental disturbance: 
• After Ty Bradford’s girlfriend claimed he had threatened her with a knife, he received a 
letter from a person who wrote that the girlfriend had admitted the accusation was false, 
but his lawyer did not investigate the issue and he was convicted (Possley, 2013f).  
 
• William Lopez was convicted of a 1990 murder in Brooklyn, but before he was 
sentenced, prosecutors turned over a letter from a woman who said that a witness against 
Lopez had admitted she had lied at his trial. Unfortunately, Lopez’ first attorney had a 
medical emergency and was replaced by another attorney who failed to investigate the 
letter or call it to the attention of the court at sentencing (Possley, 2014f). 
 
• Richard Cridelle’s first trial attorney was provided with a redacted copy of the accusing 
witness’ medical records by the prosecution and did not argue for an unedited version to 
be disclosed. When Cridelle was tried a second time with new defense counsel, that 
attorney demanded and received an un-redacted copy; the complete records revealed a 
mental health history of psychoses (Possley, 2014g). 
 
• Emmaline Williams’ adopted 14-year-old daughter accused her of sexually abusing her in 
1985, but her attorney did not investigate the accuser’s background and failed to discover 
school records stating that she had “a problem telling the truth” and was “an inveterate 
liar” (qtd. in Possley, 2014h). 
 
• Victor Caminata was convicted of an arson in which his girlfriend had incriminated him. 
His postconviction defense team discovered that five years before the fire, the girlfriend 
had filed a false police report against a previous boyfriend (Possley, 2014a).  
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• The only witness against Susan Mellen at her 1998 Los Angeles murder trial not only 
told a story at odds with the autopsy findings, but had a history of filing false reports of 
criminal behavior against various individuals in the county, “but had been discredited in 
every instance” (Possley, 2015i). 
 
• Yvonne Eldridge was accused of mistreating profoundly ill children for whom she was a 
professional caregiver. Her attorney failed to discover that the doctor who leveled the 
allegations had made unwanted sexual advances toward Eldridge and others in the 
hospital where he was employed, and had accused other women of Munchausen 
syndrome by proxy as well (Gross, 2012a). 
 
• Patrick Thompson was convicted of sexual assault despite the existence of many 
witnesses, found by his new attorneys in postconviction, who could have testified that the 
alleged victim was known for making such false accusations (Possley, 2012d).  
 
• Alfredo Vargas’ postconviction defense team located a doctor who was acquainted with 
the parents of his accuser and their propensity to make false claims that their daughter 
had been sexually abused (Possley, 2013g). 
 
 Evidence of dishonesty or confusion in discovery materials: 
• Police officers claimed that Jeanie Becerra and Arthur Morris obstructed and assaulted 
them when the officers were summoned to the couple’s home in Topeka, Kansas in 2014. 
Video of the incident was provided to defense attorneys immediately before trial but was 
not viewed at the time. After the trial, a prosecutor discovered that the video showed no 
illegal behavior on the part of Becerra and Morris (Possley, 2015e; Possley, 2015f). 
 
• Terrence Mason’s attorney failed to use a helpful police report when he cross-examined 
the only eyewitness to a robbery who effectively implicated Mason. Under questioning 
by Mason’s appellate counsel at a post-conviction proceeding, the lawyer said that he 
“must not have noticed” the report but later claimed, in response to a professional 
grievance, that he “had chosen not to make an issue” of the police report “lest it backfire” 
(Mason v. Scully, [1994], pp. 27-28). 
 
• During his trial, Dell Talley’s attorney received a coded police report that indicated that 
the victim in the case had given a description of an attacker who did not resemble Talley 
in any way. Because the attorney had not requested the report as part of a pre-trial 
investigation, he was unable to decode it and use it for impeachment purposes (Possley, 
2014i).  
 
• Antonio Williams’ lawyer did not review the original statement of the alleged victim, 
which contained no accusations against Williams (Gross, 2012b). 
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Statements in direct conflict with other credible evidence: 
• Donald Kelly’s trial lawyer failed to investigate evidence from the crime that cast doubt 
on the chief state witness, Kelly’s ex-girlfriend, who claimed she had been lying in bed 
with the victim when Kelly burst in and shot him. At a retrial, his new attorney developed 
evidence showing the ex-girlfriend’s clothing had no trace of blood, calling her account 
into question (Possley, 2013h). 
 
• George Lindstadt was accused of a sexual assault by a young girl who contradicted her 
own statement (Possley, 2013c), and the court that granted relief  found that a “lawyer 
who conducted an adequate investigation could have elicited testimony by Lindstadt that 
he did not live with his daughter at the time of the alleged abuse, and in that way (and 
others) shaken the credibility of both key prosecution witnesses” (Lindstadt v. Keane, 
[2001], p. 193). 
 
• Evidence indicated that the man who claimed Christopher Parish shot him inside an 
apartment was not truthful, but this was not investigated until his second trial, where a 
crime scene technician testified that no blood was found at the purported crime scene 
(Possley, 2015j).  
 
• A woman who claimed to have seen Jamal Trulove shoot a man from her second story 
window was discredited by the findings of a ballistics expert who concluded that the 
victim had been shot from a different direction than the witness claimed, but the expert 
was not enlisted until Trulove’s second trial, at which he was acquitted in 2015 (Possley, 
2015k).  
 
• Earl Truvia was convicted based on the testimony of a woman who claimed to see a 
shooting. If his attorney had properly investigated the case, he would have discovered 
two strong pieces of evidence that served to impeach her: the time of death found by the 
coroner did not match her statement and it was not possible to see the shooting from her 
stated vantage point (Armbrust, c. 2012). 
 
• Mark Weiner’s attorney failed to investigate cell phone records indicating that a woman 
was actually close to her mother’s home at the time she claimed Weiner was holding her 
captive in a different location (Possley, 2015l). 
 Personal grudge: 
• Roberto Miranda provided his first attorney with the names of six people who could help 
prove his innocence, but the attorney did not interview any of them. One of those people 
was the ex-girlfriend of a man who claimed to have been present when Miranda stabbed 
the victim to death. When she was finally interviewed by Miranda’s habeas attorney, she 
told of a romantic rivalry that had existed between Miranda and the witness, who had 
made threats against Miranda. The Clark County District Court judge who granted 
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Miranda’s writ held that “the lack of pretrial investigation and preparation by trial 
counsel cannot be justified” (Gross, c. 2012a).  
 
• John Palazzolo told his lawyer that the woman who had accused him of holding her 
prisoner and raping her had devised an elaborate plan to have him falsely convicted and 
provided the name of a man who could corroborate his story. The attorney did not locate 
the witness, and gave several explanations for this failure in postconviction. First the 
attorney claimed he had made a strategic decision not to pursue that line of defense, 
electing to argue instead that the sex was consensual and “keep it simple” for the judge. 
He also said that he had been unable to locate the witness through a process server. A 
postconviction investigator testified that he had found the witness within a month by 
contacting his mother (Possley, 2015m). 
 
• Jacob Trakhtenberg’s ex-wife claimed he had molested their daughter and then filed a 
civil lawsuit against him. His criminal lawyer failed to develop the evidence found later 
by his civil attorney: a deeply hostile relationship between the couple which included 
assaults by the ex-wife on Trakhtenberg and a bitter custody dispute. In addition, the ex-
wife, Trakhtenberg’s second wife, had previously accused his first wife of child sex 
abuse in an unrelated case (Possley, 2014j). 
Financial incentive: 
• Carl Chatman was accused of sexual assault in a Cook County courtroom by an aide in 
2002.  Many years earlier, the woman had received a settlement after claiming to have 
been raped in an office building. She filed suit against Cook County just days after 
accusing Chatman and was awarded over $400,000 (Possley, 2015a). 
 
• In 2001 in Palm Beach County, Florida a couple on a motorcycle was shot from a vehicle 
and the husband was struck in the hip. No leads materialized until a private investigator 
assembled a photographic line-up that included Vishnu Persad and he was identified by 
the victims and three of their friends who had witnessed the shooting. The private 
investigator brought the identification to law enforcement and Persad was charged. His 
lawyer, who had never tried a felony case, failed to develop evidence of a $10,000 reward 
the investigator would collect for his efforts, or that the eyewitnesses had all been 
drinking (Possley, 2012e). 
 
 
 Exculpatory witnesses 
Witnesses listed by the state but never called to testify or interviewed by defense: 
• Debra Brown’s attorneys failed to interview a man listed as a witness by the state before 
her murder trial. The man, who had seen the victim alive at a time which would have 
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established Brown’s innocence in her subsequent death, was never approached by the 
defense until postconviction (Possley, 2013i). 
 
• The names of two witnesses who said Oakley Engesser was not the driver of a car 
involved in a fatal accident were listed in a police report, but without the substance of 
their exculpatory statements; they were never interviewed by the defense team before his 
trial for manslaughter and were not called to testify (Possley, 2015g).  
 
• A witness listed by the state in the assault trial of Ricky Cullipher did not appear for trial. 
His attorney had not interviewed the woman and was thus unaware that she would have 
testified that the victim, whose own memory of the event was impaired, had actually shot 
himself in a game of Russian roulette (Possley, c. 2012c).  
 
• Darron Goods’ lawyer never interviewed the shooting victim in his 2005 Baltimore case, 
who was not called at the trial but later testified at a post-conviction hearing that Goods 
was not the assailant. The trial lawyer later explained that the omission was due to his 
inability to locate the victim, who was later discovered to have been in juvenile detention 
at the relevant time, telling a journalist that “it is the state’s obligation to bring in the 
victim anyway.. I had no way to find him…”; the judge who granted Goods relief said the 
trial attorney “could have or should have” interviewed him pre-trial (Bykowicz, 2005). 
No door-knocking: 
• Kelvin Wiley was convicted of beating his girlfriend after his lawyer failed to locate 
witnesses-- neighbors who saw another man enter the victim’s San Diego home before 
she was attacked inside. The judge who vacated Wiley’s conviction cited his lawyer’s 
failure to discover those witnesses through a competent investigation as grounds for relief 
(Alvord, 1992). Wiley’s appellate attorney blamed the prosecutor as well: "My own 
feeling is that the district attorney has an obligation to make sure a proper investigation is 
done.. They had a white girlfriend who said her black boyfriend did it, and they didn't 
feel they had to investigate any further" (qtd. in Alvord, 1992). 
 
 
Physical Evidence 
• Clarence Dexter, Jr. was convicted of killing his wife in 1991, based in part of faulty 
blood analysis.  Prior to a scheduled retrial, his new defense team located an expert who 
cast doubt on the blood evidence, and also discovered a bloody shoe print that was 
inconsistent with Dexter. The charges were then dismissed by the prosecution (Gross, c. 
2012b). 
 
• In Iowa, Eric Esse’s trial attorney never sought the testimony of a firearms expert who 
could have excluded a pistol linked to Esse that prosecutors incorrectly claimed was the 
murder weapon (Possley, 2013n). 
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• After her conviction, Jennifer Hall’s family hired a new attorney who did what her trial 
attorney had failed to do. An expert hired by the new attorney ruled out arson as the cause 
of the fire for which Hall had been found criminally liable (Denzel, c. 2012b). 
 
• After Jerry Jamaal Jones was accused of assaulting a cellmate, his trial attorney was 
provided with a handwritten journal of  the accuser in which he described how he was 
falsely implicating Jones (Stingl, 2011). The attorney explains his decision to disregard 
the journal and investigate no further: “I was suspicious of it from the beginning. No one 
in my experience keeps a diary in the jail and admits crimes in it” (qtd. in Stingl, 2011). 
A much less experienced post-conviction attorney had the journal examined by a 
handwriting expert who confirmed its authenticity, and Jones’ conviction was vacated 
(Stingl, 2011).  
 
• Carol Jean Wilson’s lawyer failed to fully investigate whether her handwriting linked her 
to an allegedly forged document, as the prosecution claimed, apparently because he 
feared the result would implicate her; a thorough analysis done in postconviction 
effectively excluded her (Possley, 2013j). 
 
 
Medical evidence 
 
• Judith Fritz in Pennsylvania (Possley, 2013k) and Noe Moreno in North Carolina 
(Possley, 2012f) were both convicted of vehicular manslaughter though the medical 
evidence of the automobile occupants’ injuries, never independently investigated by their 
trial lawyers, showed that they were not driving.  
 
• Rashawn Greer was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his infant child, but 
evidence developed at a re-trial indicated the child had been injured during a time period 
when Greer was not caring for her (Possley, 2013l).  
 
Debbie Loveless and her common law husband John Miller were convicted after her 4-
year-old daughter was killed in a brutal attack. The child had actually been bitten by a 
dog, as the pair claimed, but their attorneys failed to discover medical records indicating 
that wounds which appeared to have been caused by a knife were actually caused by a 
surgeon’s scalpel; in attempting to save the child’s life, tissue damaged by the dog’s teeth 
had been cleanly excised. As well, autopsy photographs showed a paw print on the 
child’s back (Possley, 2015b; Possley, 2015c). Among the findings of fact of the trial 
court which ultimately granted relief were that Miller’s trial attorney “did not pursue the 
dog defense theory because the State’s attorney told him the dogs were only ‘puppies’” 
and that neither of the privately retained attorneys for Loveless and Miller shared autopsy 
photos with a qualified expert (qtd. in FitzGerald, 1994). 
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• Nick Rhoades was convicted of criminal transmission of HIV after his attorney failed to 
discover that his viral load was undetectable and transmission would be highly unlikely 
(Possley, 2014k).  
 
• Gordon “Randy” Steidl (Center on Wrongful Convictions, c. 2012b) and Herbert 
Whitlock (Center on Wrongful Convictions, c. 2012c) were convicted even though the 
knife that a woman claimed was the murder weapon could have not inflicted the victims’ 
wounds.  
 
• Gregory Wilhoit’s family located an expert who could contest bite-mark evidence that the 
prosecution planned to use against him, but his attorney never even spoke with the expert 
(Gross, c. 2012c).  
 
 
Alibi evidence 
Institutional alibis: 
• William Walker expected to be exonerated by a videotape of an armed robbery he was 
tried for, but the videotape was never produced in court. Perhaps his attorney also relied 
on this, but he failed to investigate evidence that Walker was seeking substance abuse 
treatment at the local county Crisis Intervention Center at the relevant time, as was later 
attested to by a witness and further documented with Center records (Possley, 2015n). 
 
• James S. Anderson’s defense in a robbery case was that he had been in Los Angeles 
seeing his probation officer at a time that would have made it impossible for him to 
commit the crime, which occurred in Tacoma. He was representing himself along with 
standby counsel, who failed to subpoena the records that would have proven his alibi 
(Possley, 2014l). His girlfriend had also testified that he was in Los Angeles, but lacking 
corroboration, was not believed (In re Pers. Restraint of James S. Anderson, No. 37073-
5-h, WA Ct of Appeals 12-11-08). 
 
• Jose Garcia was sentenced to 25 years to life for murder despite the fact that he was 
incarcerated in the Dominican Republic when the victim was killed in the Bronx. 
Although the victim’s sister testified for the defense that she had spoken to Garcia by 
telephone on the night of the murder, when she believed he was in the Matanzas jail, she 
was forced to acknowledge that she had not dialed the phone herself (Garcia v. 
Portuondo, [2006]). The trial attorney cross-examined an eyewitness who had identified 
Garcia but presented no other witnesses or documents to corroborate the alibi (Garcia v. 
Portuondo, [2006]). A United States Magistrate found that the failure to have an 
investigator seek police records and travel documents and to interview potential 
witnesses constituted ineffective assistance and the reviewing appellate court agreed: 
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“His duty was to investigate, not to make do with whatever evidence fell into his lap.[fn 
omitted] …In failing to conduct any investigation at all, [his] performance at trial fell 
well below objective standards of reasonable representation” (Garcia v. Portuondo, 
[2006], p. 284). 
 
• After LaDondrell Montgomery was convicted of a violent robbery at a T-Mobile store, 
his father realized that he had been in a local jail at the time of the crime. None of the 
lawyers involved had discovered this ironclad alibi, and the judge who vacated the 
conviction said that, “Both sides in this case were spectacularly incompetent” (qtd. in 
Possley, c. 2012b). 
Employment alibis: 
• Ernesto Flores, Jr. pleaded guilty to a burglary after his attorney failed to obtain payroll 
records establishing he was at work at the time of the crime (Possley, 2015o).  
 
• Joshua Moore was working at a golf shop in Huntington Beach, California when a video 
store was robbed, but his attorney failed to develop the evidence that could prove his 
alibi, including two receipts—one of which bore Moore’s fingerprints (Possley 2012a). 
The lawyer acknowledged that he failed to contact two of Moore’s co-workers who could 
also verify his alibi, despite being aware of their potential testimony (Schou, 2011). 
Cynthia Moore, Joshua’s mother, said that, "When we hired him, he told me he knew 
how to handle the case--that he was an ex-DA and was confident he could get Josh off" 
(qtd. in Schou, 2011). 
Retail and consumer alibis: 
• Chamar Avery told his attorney he had been at an auto repair shop with several other 
young men at the time of a murder in which he had been charged. His attorney sent an 
investigator, who left a business card, but made no further attempt to verify Avery’s 
story. His lawyer would later claim that he made a “strategic decision” not to call these 
young men, whom he had never met, at Avery’s trial because he did not know what they 
“would say or how they would present” (qtd. in Possley, c. 2012d).  
 
• Magilie Conteh was posting on his Facebook account at the time of a robbery he was 
convicted of, but his attorney did not seek the records that would later be used to 
corroborate his whereabouts (Possley, 2013m).  
 
• After Lamar Palmer was convicted of an assault in Queens in 1998, his brother, a police 
officer, discovered records that proved he was on his cell phone at the time (Possley, 
2013n).  
 
• Juan Herrera’s trial lawyer called his family to testify that he was with them at a tax 
preparer’s office during the shooting for which he was convicted, but failed to obtain the 
computer records from the office that corroborated their claim (Possley, 2012g).  
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• David Hurt’s girlfriend testified that he was on the telephone with her when a gas station 
employee was murdered, but his attorney did not produce the records confirming that or 
call her parents, who would likely have been far more convincing that his romantic 
partner, as witnesses to corroborate her testimony (Possley, 2014m).  
 
• Carl Montgomery was purchasing a bicycle at Sears at the time of the crime he was 
accused of committing and had a receipt, but his lawyer failed to present the clerk’s 
disinterested and potentially highly persuasive testimony in court. Rather, he presented 
twelve close friends and relatives of Montgomery as his alibi witnesses, who were not 
believed by the jury. The appellate, granting relief, court noted that the lawyer “testified 
that his failure was due to ‘inadvertence’ as well as the fact that he ‘simply didn’t 
believe’ [Montgomery]” (Montgomery v. Petersen, [1988], p. 412) and disapproved of 
the notion “that defense counsel's conclusory statement that he did not believe his client 
was an adequate basis for ignoring such an important lead. Indeed, if counsel had taken 
the few steps necessary to identify and interview the Sears clerk, he may well have 
formed a more favorable view of his client's veracity” (Montgomery v. Petersen, [1988], 
p. 414). 
 
• Tommy Simmons III was buying items at a gas station about fifteen minutes from the 
scene during a Palmdale, California killing for which he was convicted. He provided his 
trial attorney with receipts of those purchases, but the lawyer mistakenly believed that 
they did not contain time information and never presented them in his defense (Possley, 
2014n). 
 
• Mark Weiner’s cell phone records indicated he was almost 20 miles away from a 
purported crime scene at the time a woman claimed he was holding her captive in 2012, 
but his attorney did not investigate those records (Possley, 2015l). 
Backfiring alibis: 
• Ronald Ross testified that he had been watching an NBA basketball playoffs game when 
a shooting occurred, but was contradicted by prosecutors who entered evidence that the 
shooting occurred before the game. This could have been rebutted with the fact that a 
different playoffs game was being televised at the time in question, but his attorney failed 
to marshal that evidence in his defense and he was convicted (Possley, 2013a)  
 
• Rickey Dale Thomas’ attorney presented computerized payroll records that indicated it 
would have been just possible, if a very tight timeline, for him to commit a 1989 robbery 
in Hopkins County, Texas, but the portrait they painted was incorrect. Handwritten 
records, which were more accurate, showed conclusively that he could not have 
committed the robbery, but those records were not obtained until after he was convicted 
(Possley, 2012h). 
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• Michael Hill’s trial attorney attempted to establish his alibi for a 1994 murder in 
Springfield, Massachusetts with testimony from a woman who was checking into a motel 
with him very close to the time the killing occurred. Unfortunately, the records did not 
include the specific check-in time and gave the appearance that the pair had checked in 
much earlier. Without further explanation of the discrepancy from the defense, which had 
to do with the motel’s computer system and would have corroborated the alibi, the 
erroneous records were used to impeach Hill’s witness (Possley, 2012i).  
 
• Donald Ruby’s lawyer presented an alibi witness who was flatly contradicted by 
documentary evidence showing that she was actually at work at the relevant time; it was 
only at his second trial that irrefutable evidence, based on blowfly eggs, was introduced 
to show that the murder occurred at a time when Ruby was 90 miles away (Possley, 
2014b). 
 
 
Alternate suspects 
• While awaiting sentencing on an armed robbery conviction, Roy Alvarez discovered that 
another man had been investigated for crimes that were very similar and had happened in 
the same area in the same time frame. On his own, Alvarez contacted the owner of the 
store where the robbery had occurred, and the owner then went to police. After being 
shown a photograph of the other individual, the store owner identified him as the actual 
perpetrator and Alvarez’ conviction was vacated (Possley, 2014o).  
 
• Gilbert Amezquita was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for an aggravated assault in 
which a cell phone was stolen. Had his trial attorney contacted the people who were called 
from or used the phone after it was taken from the victim, at least one of whom was listed 
in a police report provided to the defense before trial, he would have discovered Gilbert 
Guerrero, the actual attacker. The trial attorney admitted that he had done nothing more 
than read a file on the case and did no independent investigation. Paid $2500 by 
Amezquita’s family, the trial attorney later told the press: "He was going to have a hard 
enough time (just) paying my fees. He did not have money for an investigator" (qtd. in 
McVicker & Khanna, 2003). 
 
• Daniel Larsen was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to 28 years 
to life under California’s Three Strikes provision. His trial attorney failed to interview 
witnesses, including a retired police chief, who had seen another man throw the knife that 
Larsen was accused of hiding after a fight in a parking lot (Possley, 2014p).  
 
• Benjamin Miller was charged with the murders of five African American sex workers in 
1972. Several weeks later, Miller’s father read in the newspaper that another man had 
been arrested for attempting to strangle a black prostitute in the same area and informed 
Miller’s lawyer. Citing Miller’s confession, the lawyer declined to investigate further and 
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Miller was convicted (Possley, 2012j). In a case that happened nearly thirty years later, 
Richard Perez was accused of robbing a woman of her jewelry at knifepoint in Santa 
Ana, California. Before he went to trial, his mother learned of the arrest of a man who 
was similar in appearance to Perez and charged with similar crimes. Her unsupported 
suspicion that this man was the actual perpetrator of the crime her son was charged with 
was insufficient to ward off his conviction, but before Perez was sentenced she hired a 
new lawyer. Larry Magdaleno, the new lawyer’s investigator, located a former girlfriend 
of the other man who was in possession of the victim’s stolen jewelry; Perez’ conviction 
was set aside and shortly thereafter his charges were dismissed (Possley, 2012k).  
 
Discovery material 
• Edward Carter in Michigan (Possley, c. 2012e), Henry James in Louisiana (Possley, 
2014q) and Richard Johnson in Illinois (Center on Wrongful Convictions, c. 2012d) were 
all convicted of sexual assault, even though state serology reports that excluded them had 
been turned over to their lawyers.  
 
• Bruce McLaughlin’s attorney accepted inaccurate transcripts of the complaining 
witnesses’ statements without listening to the accompanying audiotapes (Possley, 2015p). 
Similarly, trial attorneys for both Sierra Rigel (Possley, 2014r) and Daniel Terens 
(Possley, 2013o) failed to examine the audiotapes of their statements to police, which 
differed markedly from the transcripts in which they appeared to incriminate themselves.  
 
• Cherice Thomas’ first attorney failed to notice a witness quoted in a police report as 
saying the perpetrator was male (Possley, 2013d).  
 
• The officer who obtained a false confession from Derek Tice noted in a report that he had 
invoked his Miranda rights, but Tice’s lawyer did not use the information to argue for 
suppression (Shaffer, c. 2012).  
 
• Peter Dombrowski’s attorney never even made the standard request for discovery, which 
would have yielded exculpatory fingerprint evidence (Possley, 2014s).  
 
• Rafael Madrigal’s trial attorney did not transcribe audiotapes he received from the 
prosecution despite having been granted a continuance to examine them, so he never 
learned that they contained valuable exculpatory evidence. Additionally, he ignored 
reports of interviews conducted by a public defender investigator, contained in the file he 
received from that office when he took over the case, that could have led to testimony 
from his supervisor establishing that Madrigal was at work at the time of the offense 
(Madrigal v. Yates, 2009). 
 
• Terrence Mason’s attorney failed to use a helpful police report when he cross-examined 
the only eyewitness to a robbery who effectively implicated Mason. Under questioning 
 68 
 
by Mason’s appellate counsel at a post-conviction proceeding, the lawyer said that he 
“must not have noticed” the report but later claimed, in response to a professional 
grievance, that he “had chosen not to make an issue” of the police report “lest it backfire” 
(Mason v. Scully, 1994, pp. 27-28). 
 
• David Tucker’s trial lawyer testified in postconviction that his lack of knowledge that the 
victim had identified another person as the man who beat him was the result of his failure 
to ask for police reports; he “had trusted the prosecution to provide him with relevant 
documents and he had not requested police investigation reports” (Tucker v. Prelesnik, 
[1999], p. 751). 
 
Crime scene 
• John Jackson was represented by a private attorney who received a flat fee for all his 
work on public defense cases. When answering allegations of neglect by a different 
client, the attorney argued that the client “believes my role is to find proof that he's 
innocent of this particular charge. I've explained to him the role, or my role, is to see his 
constitutional rights are protected" and yet conceptualized that role as that of a referee 
rather than that of an advocate (qtd. in Armstrong, Davila, and Mayo, 2004). The judge 
that granted Jackson’s writ of habeas corpus said the attorney’s failure to visit the crime 
scene amounted to the omission of a “fundamental task” and, combined with his other 
failures to challenge the state’s inculpatory facts, constituted ineffective assistance 
(Armstrong, Davila, and Mayo, 2004). The judge admonished that the attorney: “those 
are the facts that you begin with, not the facts you end with" (qtd. in Armstrong, Davila, 
and Mayo, 2004). 
 
DNA evidence 
• In Florida, Jesse Miller Jr. was convicted at his first two trials in large part on the basis of 
DNA evidence that state experts claimed incontrovertibly placed Miller at the crime 
scene, but was acquitted at his third trial after his new attorney hired an independent 
expert to challenge the flawed DNA examination done by the state’s analyst (Duret, 
2014; Freeman, 2014). 
 
Client’s mental status and psychological background 
• Dayna Christoph, a juvenile, confessed to sexually abusing her younger sister and was 
convicted; the Washington Court of Appeals found that “a minimally adequate 
investigation would have discovered Ms. Christoph’s documented long-term mental and 
emotional difficulties and sufficient exculpatory evidence to warrant dismissal of the 
charge of the information, or at the very least, to support a plea bargain for reduced 
charges”; Christoph’s lawyer devoted less than two hours to her case (State v. Christoph, 
2000). 
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• Detectives claimed that Carl Chatman confessed to a 2002 sexual assault that occurred in 
a Chicago courtroom. His attorney failed to uncover his extensive mental health history, 
including a diagnosis of schizophrenia and repeated hospitalization, and never requested 
a competency hearing (Possley, 2015a).  
 
• Ronald Keith Williamson in Oklahoma had a significant mental health history and made 
incriminating statements that on their face suggested mental disturbance, but his trial 
attorney failed to even request a competency hearing before he was tried for sexual 
assault homicide and, later, sentenced to death (Possley, 2014t; see also Grisham, 2006). 
 
• 14-year-old Lorenzo Montoya’s school records showed that his IQ had been measured at 
69 and he was in a special education placement, but this information was not developed 
until an investigator working for his postconviction counsel uncovered it years later. By 
then, he had spent 14 years incarcerated in a 2000 murder for which he had implicated 
himself and two other youths (Possley, 2014u). 
 
• Boping Chen’s lawyer did not develop psychiatric testimony indicating that he was not a 
pedophile (Possley, 2012c), and Henry Cunningham’s attorney did not investigate his 
sexual dysfunction as a defense to a child sex abuse charge (Possley, c. 2012f).  
 
• Sandra Ortiz (Possley, 2013p) and Carol Stonehouse (Possley, 2013q) were convicted of 
killing abusive romantic partners when a comprehensive investigation would have 
revealed facts supporting a battered woman syndrome defense. 
 
 
Client’s criminal history 
• Longino Acero had a previous conviction that did not require registration as a sex 
offender, but his attorneys never checked his court file and advised him to plead guilty to 
a charge of failing to register. Corey Eason was also convicted of failing to register as a 
sex offender, though it was clear from his record that he had never been convicted of any 
offense that would require him to do so. Simon Rivera also was required to register in 
error because his criminal history was not fully investigated (Possley, 2014e).  
 
• Alexander Hebrard was convicted of illegal possession of a firearm, despite the fact that 
the underlying felony charge which would have made him ineligible to possess such a 
weapon had actually been dismissed (Possley, 2013c).  
 
• Jeffery Rodriguez’ first armed robbery trial ended in a hung jury but his attorney failed to 
order the transcripts of that proceeding, hobbling the cross-examination of the 
complaining witness at the 2003 re-trial where he was convicted (Denzel, c. 2012c).  
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Appendix B.  
 
Cases in which a comprehensive defense investigation could have prevented the conviction 
 
   1.  Acero, Longino 
   2. Adams, Jarrett 
   3. Addison, Ronald 
   4. Allen, Billy Frederick 
   5. Alowonle, Rilwan 
   6. Amezquita, Gilbert 
   7. Anderson, James S. 
   8. Anderson, Roland 
   9. Appling, Riolordo 
  10. Austin, Michael 
  11. Avery, Chamar 
  12. Aviles, Anselmo 
  13. Baba-Ali, Amine 
  14. Baker, Jimmy Lee 
  15. Baltrip, Henry 
  16. Baran, Bernard 
  17. Bass, Jimmie 
  18. Baumer, Julie 
  19. Baylor, Ronnie 
  20. Becerra, Jeanie 
  21. Bell, Derrick 
  22. Bell, Jr., James 
  23. Berry, Wilder 
  24. Blackshire, James 
  25. Blake, Bryan 
  26. Boyd, Latherial  
  27. Bradford, Ty 
  28. Bragg, Rodney L. 
  29. Bravo, Mark 
  30. Bright, Gregory 
  31. Britt, Cheydrick 
  32. Britton, Robert 
  33. Bromgard, Jimmy Ray 
  34. Buchli II, Richard 
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  35. Caldwell, Maurice 
  36. Caminata, Victor 
  37. Canen, Lana 
  38. Carter, Edward 
  39. Catron, Xavier 
  40. Cesar (1), Owen  
  41. Cesar (2), Owen  
  42. Chatman, Carl 
  43. Cheung, Kum Yet 
  44. Chumley, Tom Edwin 
  45. Clay, Sr., David 
  46. Coker, Edgar 
  47. Connor, Reginald 
  48. Contee, Darian 
  49. Conteh, Maligie 
  50. Cridelle, Richard 
  51. Cservak, Wayne 
  52. Cullipher, Ricky 
  53. Cunningham, Henry 
  54. Day, Lee Antione 
  55. Dexter, Jr., Clarence Richard 
  56. Dombrowski, Peter 
  57. Earle, Margaret 
  58. Eason, Corey 
  59. Eldridge, Yvonne 
  60. Engesser, Oakley 
  61. Esse, Eric 
  62. Flores, Ernesto Jr. 
  63. Ford, Glenn  
  64. Fritz, Judith 
  65. Garcia, Jose 
  66. Gassman, Tyler W. 
  67. Gathers, Gary 
  68. Golden, Andrew 
  69. Gondor, Robert 
  70. Goods, Darron 
  71. Greene, Cy 
  72. Greer, Rashawn 
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  73. Gross, George 
  74. Hales, Warren 
  75. Hall, Jennifer 
  76. Hamilton, Derrick 
  77. Hampton, Patrick 
  78. Harris, Keith 
  79. Harris, Nicole 
  80. Harris, Warren 
  81. Hash, Michael 
  82. Hays, Robert  
  83. Hebrard, Alexander 
  84. Hebshie, James 
  85. Helmig, Dale 
  86. Henly, Brock 
  87. Hernandez, Maria 
  88. Herrera, Juan 
  89. Herrera, Bobby Paiste 
  90. Hicks, Anthony 
  91. Hill, Michael 
  92. Howard, DeAndre 
  93. Hughes, Elicia 
  94. Hurt, David 
  95. Jackson, John 
  96. James, Henry 
  97. Jasin, Thomas 
  98. Johnson, Juan 
  99. Johnson, Richard 
100. Johnson, Terrell 
101. Jones, Jerry Jamaal 
102. Jones, Levon Junior 
103. Jones, Lydia Diane 
104. Kelly, Donald 
105. Kluppelberg, James 
106. Knupp, Richard 
107. Lamb, Larry 
108. Larsen, Daniel 
109. Larson, Robert E. 
110. Lawrence, Darrian Mark 
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111. Lee, Kuoa Fong 
112. Leverett, Ron 
113. Lindstadt, George 
114. Livingston, Christopher 
115. Lopez, George 
116. Lopez, William 
117. Loveless, Debbie 
118. Lynn, Eric 
119. Madrigal, Rafael 
120. Magnan, Paul Philip 
121. Martin, Kevin 
122. Mason, Terrence 
123. McGee, Leroy 
124. McLaughlin, Bruce 
125. Mellen, Susan 
126. Merrill, Thomas 
127. Miller, Benjamin 
128. Miller, Harry 
129. Miller, John 
130. Mills, Randall 
131. Miranda, Roberto 
132. Mitchell, Charlie 
133. Mitchell, Keith 
134. Montgomery, Carl 
135. Montgomery, LaDondrell  
136. Montoya, Lorenzo 
137. Moore, Joshua 
138. Morales, Santiago Ventura 
139. Moreno, Noe 
140. Morris, Arthur 
141. Munoz, Cesar 
142. Murray, Lacresha 
143. Neirynck, Brian 
144. Nelson, Gary 
145. Nieves, William 
146. Nnodimele, Martin 
147. Ortiz, Sandra 
148. Padilla, Fidel 
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149. Palazollo, John 
150. Paradis, Donald 
151. Parish, Christopher 
152. Perez, Richard 
153. Persad, Vishnu 
154. Pettit, Leona 
155. Pichardo, Juan Carlos 
156. Potts, Clinton 
157. Raby, Jr., Earl 
158. Ralston, Sean 
159. Ramirez, Jesus 
160. Ramos, Jesse 
161. Randolph, Guy 
162. Register, Kash 
163. Resh, Randy 
164. Rhoades, Nick 
165. Rigel, Sierra 
166. Rivera, Simon Angel 
167. Roberts, Lisa 
168. Robles, Willie 
169. Rocha, Mario 
170. Roesser, Christopher 
171. Rojas, Luis Kevin 
172. Rollin, Joseph Pierre 
173. Rollins, Lafonso 
174. Rose, Peter 
175. Ross, Ronald 
176. Ruby, Donald 
177. Schulz, Stephen 
178. Sifuentes, Alberto 
179. Simmons III, Tommy 
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